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THE RITE OF RHETORIC:  COGNITIVE
FRAMING IN TECHNOLOGY LAW
Chris Riley*
ABSTRACT
This Article examines the use of cognitive framing techniques in litigation in
technology law.  I offer a model to understand and evaluate the strength of a “fram-
ing argument”—consisting of a legal argument, a frame, and a connection between
the two—and I identify and analyze framing arguments in four recent technology law
cases.  I contend that framing arguments play a major role in these cases because
technology law is particularly susceptible to them.  Ambiguities in the statutes and
precedents and ambiguities in the technologies create room for judgments of equity
to shape the law.  Furthermore, genuine doubt concerning the correct social policies
creates room for framing arguments to influence judgments of equity—and, thus, to
influence the development of new law.  By demonstrating the nature and significance
of framing arguments, I hope to help increase judges’ awareness of them, to allow
judges to gauge equities more objectively, and to help attorneys be more effective in
their framing arguments to produce a greater balance in attorney skill.
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INTRODUCTION
As legal issues arising from technology innovation grow more and more
complex, judges and juries become more and more susceptible to a cognitive
trap that can significantly influence their decisions.  This cognitive trap is cre-
ated by the rhetorical device of “framing,” which involves the use of language
to trigger existing mental structures (the “frames”), and by arguments that
incorporate framing to attempt to influence a decision.1  Technology law is
filled with frames.  Many of them have only existed in the public mind for a
few years, as they derive from recently passed statutes and recently invented
technologies.  For example, newspapers and magazines have exploded with
both terror stories of the death of the music industry as a result of illegal
downloading, and with incredible success stories of companies such as
Microsoft and Google.  Together, these stories have created a widely known—
yet limited—understanding of the equities involved in the frames of piracy,
innovation, and privacy.  Although popular understanding of these concepts
and contexts is rich, the formal legal understanding is poor:  most federal
1 As I use the term, a frame is a concept such as an activity or a value, and the language
used can range from explicit metaphor or analogy to more subtle techniques such as empha-
sis through word repetition and rearrangement.  The concept of framing is discussed in more
detail in Section I infra.
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judges have limited experience with piracy, innovation, privacy, and other
frames of technology law.  This disparity creates fertile ground for framing
arguments to have a considerable impact.
At the same time, the structure of legal reasoning leaves room for framing
arguments to influence judges and juries in the sense that parties may offer
rational and legitimate legal justifications to support any position in a case.2
Like other forms of rhetoric and argument, framing arguments can influence a
decision.  Moreover, in many contexts, such as where the decision is based on
statutory interpretation, the change brought about by framing arguments can be
formally ratified after the fact merely by citing to one justification rather than
another.
In this Article, I examine the use of framing in litigation in technology
law.  I offer a model to understand and evaluate the strength of a framing argu-
ment – separating it into a legal argument, a frame (including the inherent
strength of the frame and its relevance to the facts of the case), and a connec-
tion between the frame and the legal argument—and I analyze the framing
arguments in four recent technology law cases against this model.  I contend
that strong framing arguments greatly increase a party’s chances of winning a
case,3 supporting my position through case studies and a theoretical model of
technology litigation that explains why it is both possible, and in some sense
rational (or at least understandable), for judges to be influenced by framing
arguments.
Framing arguments are powerful in technology law because of the inher-
ent ambiguities therein.  Ambiguities in statutes and technologies create room
for equitable arguments to shape the law, and ambiguities in the correct social
policies of technology create room for framing to influence equity judgments.
By demonstrating and explaining this context and the framing arguments that
take place within it, I hope to educate judges to be more alert to framing so they
may gauge equities more objectively, to educate attorneys to be more effective
in their framing arguments, and to educate the news media and the public so
they may invest effort into developing a more informed and accurate view of
the social policies involved in technology law.4
2 See, e.g., STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST 142-43 (2001) (“[In one] view,
the precedents will always be sufficiently rich in competing arguments and rationales that
skillful lawyers should be able to extract a version of the case law favorable to their side.”).
Winter notes that this indeterminism may be based on an inaccurate understanding of the
nature of reasoning. Id. at 143.  Note, also, that few supporters of this proposition would go
so far as to argue that both sides are equally compelling in their reasoning.
3 Though framing techniques can be effective at all levels, they are likely far more effective
at the appellate level, where judges place more emphasis on the proper interpretation of
statutes and precedents, and less emphasis on procedure and evidence and other essential
components of successful trial practice.
4 My intention in this Article is not to malign the abilities of the writers of the briefs I study.
I will criticize the briefs in my sample cases, and I will imply, if not say explicitly, that, in
many ways, they could be improved.  However, I admit that there is a lot more to writing a
brief than effective framing.  My objective in this Article is merely to argue that framing is
one component of the large, complex puzzle that is practical legal argumentation.
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I. FRAMING AND TECHNOLOGY LAW
In the common usage of the concept of “framing” in communication, the
speaker uses mildly deceptive techniques, such as weak analogies and artificial
emphasis and de-emphasis, to sway the listener’s understanding of a context.5
Framing is a tool of rhetoric rather than substance.  It has a more specific and
sophisticated purpose than getting the listener to feel an emotion like anger or
pity.  One sort of framing happens in ordinary conversation whenever the
speaker wants to avoid a likely interpretation that is not favorable to them.
People frame to cushion the emotional blow of a loss, for example, by disguis-
ing it as a gain, pretending that the good effects are more important than the
bad.  People also frame to sway others to their side of an argument by creating
connections that are not there, or by hiding existing connections.  However,
framing is not restricted to these simple techniques.
Framing in this Article is more than merely defining the terms of the
debate.  More sophisticated forms of framing tap into existing cognitive struc-
tures, hierarchies of one’s memories and experiences, to create new (or
strengthen existing) mental connections between the context of the conversa-
tion or argument at hand, and some other significant context.6  The speaker
attempts to transfer the listener’s normative views in a source context to
another context which is not necessarily (but can be) related to the source.
These types of framing techniques are sometimes implemented as simple (but
powerful) metaphors,7 and sometimes as more subtle choices of emphasis.8  In
the courtroom, judges and lawyers try to be above pure rhetoric, insofar as they
construct the law.  Many seek to achieve a level of almost scientific precision
in their reasoning.  Despite these lofty ideals, parties in court cases certainly
attempt to implement framing arguments.  The open questions, which this Arti-
cle begins to address, are how much framing is attempted, how much it dis-
places pure, technical legal argument, and, most importantly, how much impact
it has on the court’s decision.
Before getting into these questions, I will first discuss the concept of fram-
ing in more detail, explaining how my use of the term differs slightly from its
use in other scholarship, as I closely tailor my concept of framing to my target
legal context.  I will also discuss “technology law” as I use the term, along with
some existing scholarship that examines specific framing issues in technology
law.  This section will demonstrate that, although framing plays an important
5 Dictionary definitions of “frame” include “to fit or adjust especially to something or for an
end” and to “contrive.”  Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, Frame, http://merriam-web-
ster.com/dictionary/frame (last visited May 13, 2009).
6 For example, George Lakoff discusses the use of the phrase “tax relief” instead of “tax
cut,” which connects the context of a tax rate reduction to the old and previously unrelated
context of an affliction, thus making people consider taxes more like undue burdens and
adding further positive value to tax cuts. GEORGE LAKOFF, DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT!
KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE DEBATE 24-26 (2004).
7 Consider Lakoff’s tax relief metaphor, or, even better, President Bush’s use of the phrase
“permission slip” to make opponents seem condescending and childish. Id. at 4, 11.
8 Id. at 32 (giving examples of partial birth abortion and school testing in which a debate
can be focused on a clearer and less controversial issue to establish the proper context before
segueing into a debate over a more controversial issue).
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role in litigation in a broader context, its role is much more significant in tech-
nology law.  Specifically, framing’s role is more significant because the law
gives it room to work, because important and focused frames exist and have a
great deal of weight, and because the institutions involved may be inclined to
give the frames even more weight.
A. Framing in Social Science, Political Science, Law, and Economics
Erving Goffman introduced the concept of framing in the social sciences
in 1974.9  To Goffman, framing involves a transformation of one context into
another, creating an alternative interpretation of what is actually occurring.10
Goffman gives two primary mechanisms for this manipulation:  keyings and
fabrications.11  A keying is a contextual transformation of a literal activity into
something—for example, a staging (such as a play), a fantasizing, or an analy-
sis.12  Knowing the context, the audience can transform statements such as “His
bishop is about to threaten my knight” into a statement describing the position
of plastic chess pieces on a chessboard, rather than a literal statement about a
Catholic priest assaulting a man on a horse.13  By contrast, a fabrication is a
more deliberate manipulation designed to create a false and misleading percep-
tion.14  As opposed to the keying process, which is more of an open and mutual
social transformation, a fabrication is a deliberate, one-sided deception, and can
be broken when the “contained party” realizes he is being manipulated.15
George Lakoff revived and popularized the concept of framing by apply-
ing it to political science in his 2004 book, Don’t Think of an Elephant!.16  In
his framing analysis, Lakoff describes two models of the proper organization of
the family:  the “strict father” model and the “nurturant parent” model.17
Lakoff uses these two models as lenses to understand the design of legal
9 See ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS:  AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF EXPERI-
ENCE (1974).
10 Goffman begins by discussing the “primary framework” as a context for understanding
social activity, id. at 21-26, and then discusses how certain social contexts impose a non-
literal, primary framework over a literal activity to change people’s interpretations of the
activity, id. at 47.  For example, two people passing each other in a hallway may say,
“How’s it going?” as a way of saying “Hello,” rather than literally inquiring into the other
person’s status. See id.  Goffman’s fabrication resembles the framing studied in this Article,
though his book studies a far more abstract concept based in a far more general social con-
text than my limited treatment of linguistic attachment of factual contexts to certain specific
frames.
11 Id. at 45-46, 83-85.
12 Id. at 45.
13 Id. at 46.  One could also view this example as a mere word ambiguity or a simple
metaphor, but this does not capture the richness of the keying concept.  One of Goffman’s
greatest contributions was his isolation of, and emphasis on, the transformation process, as
opposed to the substance of the transformed words (exaggerated further by the framing
inherent in the choice of the term “keying”), teasing it out of “the flux of social experience.”
Fredric Jameson, On Goffman’s “Frame Analysis”, 3 THEORY & SOC’Y 119, 126-27 (1976).
14 GOFFMAN, supra note 9, at 83 (defining fabrication as “the intentional effort of one or
more individuals to manage activity so that a party of one or more others will be induced to
have a false belief about what it is that is going on”).
15 Id. at 84-85.
16 LAKOFF, supra note 6.
17 Id. at 6-15.
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regimes by Republicans and Democrats.18  Lakoff centers his concept of fram-
ing not on argumentation itself, but on the association between words and
mental concepts, and the biological basis for it.19  Additionally, given the
nature of this association, some worldviews fit some frames better than others,
creating the distinct possibility of argumentative techniques based on fram-
ing.20  Practical framing activity by political machines is based on the appropri-
ate choice of language—e.g., speakers describe activities using terminology
that reinforces their fundamental worldviews.21  Lakoff uses framing to explain
Republican political successes in recent decades, to which he credits, in part,
operatives in the Republican Party who have emphasized framing techniques
for some time.22  Arguments based on Lakoff’s abstract framing technique are
fairly straightforward:  connect one context (such as the family) to another, the
latter of which is not strictly related to the former (for example, foreign policy),
through the use of language.23  Framing and framing arguments, as I will use
them in this Article, are similar, though my contexts tend to be somewhat dif-
ferent and generally less abstract.24
The study of framing in the legal context is sparser, but Anthony Amster-
dam and Jerome Bruner made one major attempt in their 2000 book, Minding
the Law.25  Amsterdam and Bruner examine a category of psychological fram-
ing that they call “rhetorics,” which they describe as “various linguistic
processes by which a speaker can create, address, avoid, or shape issues that the
speaker wishes or is called upon to contest . . . .”26  Rhetorics is one of three
major categories of psychological tools, along with “categorization”27 and
“narrative.”28  After some discussion of the use of language tricks and the
meanings that can be derived from context, Amsterdam and Bruner describe
how the law creates room for manipulation by rhetoric.  For example, in litiga-
tion, Amsterdam and Bruner state, “the very name of the game is to contest the
meanings of communications and to take apart the  . . . adversary’s interpretive
frame.”29  This is true, despite the fact that, on the surface, the legal system
must appear cooperative and straightforward.30  This split between form and
substance creates a great deal of room for subtle framing, and a great deal of
18 Id.
19 Id. at 17 (“People think in frames. . . . Neuroscience tells us that each of the concepts we
have—the long-term concepts that structure how we think—is instantiated in the synapses of
our brains.”).
20 See, e.g., id. at 23-24 (discussing the difference between conservatives, who can use a
simple frame of “tax relief,” and liberals, who cannot apply the frame to their proposals and
must engage in more complex language).
21 Id. at 21.
22 Id. at 22-23 (giving the example of Frank Luntz).
23 See, e.g., id. at 10 (arguing that, under the strict father model of the family, the United
States is the father, the strong moral authority, and should not bend its understandings of
what is right).
24 This will be discussed in Section II.A, infra.
25 ANTHONY AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW (2000).
26 Id. at 165.
27 Id. at 19-20.
28 Id. at 110-14.
29 Id. at 173.
30 Id. at 172-74.
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value for the detection and exposure of the other side’s “rhetorical tricks.”31
After establishing the three main concepts, Amsterdam and Bruner apply them
to the study of several civil rights cases, essentially finding that those civil
rights cases whose holdings can be questioned from a liberal perspective were
written with deceptive framing-style techniques, and that the opinions in these
cases are motivated by mental connections to abstract concepts, such as the
legend of Guinevere and its influence on Justice Antonin Scalia’s understand-
ing of adultery.32  Judge Richard Posner, in reviewing Amsterdam’s and
Bruner’s work, challenged their “radical subjectivism,” and claimed their theo-
ries could be used to demonstrate bias in any holding of any case.33  Amster-
dam and Bruner ultimately cannot rise above bias in the application of their
theory, nor do they even claim to.34  However, they begin with a solid theory of
framing (or rhetoric as they call it), and offer some justifications as to why it
might be effective in the field of law.
Steven Winter gives a detailed examination of jurisprudence through the
lens of cognitive theory in his book, A Clearing in the Forest.35  Although
many legal theorists contend that law is indeterminate,36 Winter argues that this
view is the result of artificially imposing a rationalist model on law, and that
alternative models drawn from cognitive science can produce more accurate,
and more determinative, interpretations of the legal decision-making process.37
Winter acknowledges formal legal doctrine does not control legal decision-
making,38 or, perhaps more accurately, to view jurisprudence as if determined
entirely by doctrine is inaccurate.  In Winter’s view, a lawyer’s objective is to
persuade, and while this persuasion may incorporate legal doctrine, “tacit
knowledge,” along with “values, beliefs, and understandings of the deci-
sionmakers,” ultimately drive a lawyer’s decision.39  Effective persuasion
requires an understanding of the “categories and concepts” that drive the people
making the decisions—or, as Winter explains:  “Legal materials do not decide
cases, people do.”40  These “categories and concepts” resemble the frames I use
31 Id. at 176.
32 Id. at 81-91. See also Richard A. Posner, The Law of the Beholder, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct.
16, 2000, at 49, 49-51 (reviewing ANTHONY AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE
LAW (2000)) (arguing that Amsterdam and Bruner’s critiques can be as easily applied to
other, liberal friendly, civil rights cases, and perhaps all jurisprudence).
33 Posner, supra note 32, at 50.
34 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 25, at 10-11.
35 WINTER, supra note 2.
36 Id. at 10, 310-13 (discussing the arguments of Joseph Singer and Duncan Kennedy, who
both contend that legal doctrine is not determinate).
37 See, e.g., id. at 139-40 (examining an older Supreme Court case utilizing the rationalist
model, which makes it appear to be somewhat “unpredictable and incoherent,” and using a
model which incorporates “radial categories” rather than “standard analytic categories”).
Ultimately, though, Winter seems to acknowledge some degree of indeterminacy in certain
areas of the law. See id. at 330 (“Once we recognize that constraint is not an all-or-nothing
phenomenon, it becomes easier to see that different areas of law exhibit different degrees of
constraint and, thus, of stability.”).
38 Id. at 3 (“[I]t is widely recognized that the surface logic of the discipline does not govern
the decisionmaking process.”).
39 Id. at 3, 319.
40 Id. at 153.
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in this Article.  They are imbued with considerable social significance and
value,41 and there may be multiple (and even, perhaps, mutually exclusive)
categories to apply when interpreting the facts of a case at hand, a decision
which may result in a different legal outcome.42
Although hard evidence of the effects of framing is rare, Chris Guthrie,
Jeffrey Rachlinski, and Andrew Wistrich surveyed 167 federal magistrate
judges to determine the effects of the following five different “cognitive illu-
sions”:  framing, anchoring, hindsight bias, the representativeness heuristic, and
egocentric biases.43  The surveyors’ concept of framing differs from others pre-
viously discussed in this Article; their perspective focuses on a more economic-
based view of the mind’s perceptions of gains and losses.44  Framing affects the
plaintiff’s and the defendant’s perceptions of the value of settlements compared
to the probability and value of success on the merits.45  Guthrie, Rachlinski,
and Wistrich examine the reactions of magistrate judges to a hypothetical in
which the judges advise plaintiffs and defendants whether to go to trial, or to
accept a settlement, which awarded slightly more money to the plaintiff than
the expected return of the trial.46  The judges’ decisions demonstrated a statisti-
cally significant difference depending on whether they were advising the plain-
tiff or the defendant.47  Although this conception of framing is far narrower
than my own, it nevertheless offers some level of empirical support, if only for
the statement that judges do not reliably make exact definitions, even when the
question can be made in a straightforward and technical manner.
B. Framing in this Article
The sense of framing I use in this Article is similar, but not identical, to
the concepts used by Goffman, Lakoff, and Winter.  In the abstract, the framing
activity I study follows the general pattern of Lakoff:  in litigation, the author
of a brief attempts to connect an outside context or cognitive structure to the
context of the case through effective language, emphasis, and other tech-
niques.48  However, as I use the term, the “outside context” is not completely
outside; instead, the world of technology becomes the context.  Rather than
basing my analysis on abstract frames, such as the Arthurian legends or the
social construction of the family, I examine (primarily) frames developed by
major media in their reporting on the technology industry.49  The cases I study
do not merely evoke frames developed by the media—they invoke them,
directly.  The process of framing is therefore much more observable and open,
41 See id. at 154-55 (describing the distinct meanings and values of the concepts of “prison”
and “parent” in the context of two cases).
42 See, e.g., id. at 164 (“Is burning a draft card properly classified as political speech, as
destruction of government property, or as obstruction of a lawful state function?”).
43 Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 784 (2001).
44 Id. at 794.
45 Id. at 795.
46 Id. at 796-97.
47 Id. at 797.
48 See LAKOFF, supra note 6, at 9-10 (describing a specific act of framing, the use of lan-
guage to map the strict father family model to foreign policy).
49 Specifically, in this Article, I examine the frames of piracy, privacy, and innovation—
though this is not intended to be an exclusive set. See infra Section I.C.2.
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and yet manages to be no less effective because, although it otherwise resem-
bles Goffman’s fabrication, it loses the stink of deception that gave the oppos-
ing arguer an easy out, and it has a closer connection to the facts of a case at
hand.
The distinction between evoking and invoking frames is significant for
many reasons.  In this Article, I draw my frames from the world of technology
and technology law, as opposed to an outside context, which makes it much
harder to identify and isolate framing arguments as opposed to more traditional
forms of argument on the merits of a case.  Given the newness of the field,
judges faced with framing laden arguments have few sources of unbiased
descriptions of the factual and legal contexts of technology cases; in addition,
judges have a limited independent understanding of the contexts.  As a result,
judges will have even more difficulty separating out the more tightly integrated
framing in technology law.  Nevertheless, judges have a great deal of experi-
ence in working with the law as law and the facts as facts.  If they become more
familiar with specific problem frames and isolate their analyses and opinions
on legal and factual aspects of the cases, while separating the rhetoric and
equity associated with these frames, they can make great strides in improving
the objectivity of their decisions.
The frames I consider in this Article include a few of the “hot button”
issues of technology reporters:  piracy, innovation, and privacy.  These frames
may not reflect as deep or general an understanding of the world and proper
social organization as Lakoff’s “family values” approach,50 but they work in
the same manner.  A plaintiff attorney’s legal argument over the proper inter-
pretation of a statute is greatly strengthened if the attorney convinces the judge
(and the jury) that the defendant’s activities created a strong social harm in the
realm of technology law, a harm well understood in the context of the frame
invoked, but not yet considered, in the context of the facts of the case at hand.
For example, framing through the lens of “piracy” can influence a judge’s
understanding of the nature of secondary copyright liability,51 or the scope of a
statutory exemption in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.52
C. “Technology Law” and its Frames
1. Technology Law
The cases and frames I will examine all lie within the context of “technol-
ogy law.”  The similar term “cyberlaw”53 does not exactly describe the sort of
50 See supra Section I.A.
51 I discuss “piracy” framing in the context of secondary copyright liability in greater detail
in later sections on the MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster II), 545 U.S. 913
(2005), decision by the United States Supreme Court. See infra Section II.B.4.
52 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 103(a), 112 Stat. 2860, 2866
(1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d) (2006)) (“DMCA”).  This is discussed in detail in a
later section on the Davidson & Associates v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005), case. See
infra Section II.B.2.
53 There has been considerable debate on the question of whether to study “cyberlaw” as an
independent discipline. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the
Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207; Lawrence Lessig, Commentary, The Law of the Horse:
What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999).
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cases with which I am concerned.  I define “technology law” cases as those that
involve computer software and hardware products, and deal with regulation of
the design or use of the technology because of the nature of the design or use
being regulated.  For example, I do not consider a patent infringement case
concerning a hardware design to be a “technology law” case, at least for the
purposes of this Article, because the challenged activity is only illegal because
someone else thought of it first.  However, framing can influence patent law in
the same way as technology law, but the clearest context to see the effects of
framing lies in those cases where the technologies at issue are regulated by
computer-specific statutes and/or by copyright and related laws.
In technology law, the statutes and the technologies are brand new and
filled with ambiguity.  Computer scientists develop and name technologies with
little regard to the clarity of their chosen terminology, resulting in considerable
ambiguity of definition.  Statutes regulating these ambiguously-specified tech-
nologies are passed by technically inexperienced lawmakers, with technical
guidance drawn from biased industry representatives, on the one side, and
equally biased public interest groups, on the other.  On some level, this is true
of all law; one of the major purposes of the judicial system is the refinement
and clarification of slightly vague general statutes produced by public choice
processes driven by highly varied interests.54  However, in the context of tech-
nology law, given how quickly the statutes and the technologies change, every
case of statutory interpretation that reaches a court is reviewed de novo.55  As a
result, judges always have room to (and, arguably, must) import equitable judg-
ments into their interpretations, as they apply the (still largely unlitigated) legal
doctrine to the (brand new) facts of a case at hand.  This increased judicial
flexibility does not necessarily create room for framing, if the judges are able to
make fully objective and neutral equitable determinations.  However, no one
can make fully objective and neutral equitable determinations.  Judges read The
New York Times and other major general media, the briefs submitted by the
parties for the case at hand, and some of the relevant major precedents.56
Judges may not have read a single statement by an industry representative, a
public interest technology law group, or anyone with a technical background,
except presumably those contained within amicus briefs, if any, submitted for
the case at hand.57  As a result, the non-specialist judges are particularly sus-
54 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544-47
(1983) (offering a narrow form of construction to fill gaps in statutes, and stating that public
choice theory leads to the proposition “courts cannot reconstruct an original meaning
because there is none to find”).
55 See, e.g., Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).  In Davidson, the
court interpreted the statutory term “interoperability” which had been interpreted by only one
past case; the past case examined the term in the context of computer printer hardware, and
Davidson examined the term as applied to video game software. Id. at 640-41; see infra
Section II.B.2.
56 I do not mean to imply that the mass media bias the judge’s decision, merely that non-
specialist judges cannot be expected to possess a greater knowledge of technical concepts
than that presented in mainstream media.  The lack of specialist knowledge opens them to
the effects and bias introduced by framing.
57 Also, consider that most of the work in litigation happens at the district and the appellate
court levels, where amicus briefs are typically fewer in number than in cases before the
United States Supreme Court.
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ceptible to persuasion by framing, efforts to interpret the precedents, and the
facts of the case at hand in light of major news stories.  Strong framing casts
the unresolved ambiguities in the law, and in the technology industry, in a light
that exaggerates the social impact of the case, making it seem as if ruling in
favor of the other party will destroy an essential social balance in technology
law.  Successful briefs and arguments emphasize subtle equitable arguments
that draw on major news stories and hot-button issues that the judges are famil-
iar with, transforming the process of litigation from a rational weighting of
principles and canons of construction and equities, into a contest of illusions.
2. The Frames
I will focus on three major frames in this Article:  piracy, innovation, and
privacy.  These are not the only frames that appear in technology law cases,
although they are among the most important.58
The notion of “piracy” originated in a maritime context.59  For thousands
of years, pirates at sea terrorized ships, engaging in unlawful and violent rob-
bery.60  Pirates operate in waters that lie outside the territorial boundaries of
any individual nation, leading to complex questions of legal jurisdiction, and
rendering prosecution somewhat more complicated.61  The context of pirates
operating outside the bounds of legal control is analogous to the Internet—a
similar international world, one that appears largely beyond the legal control of
any individual nation.  To call an individual who makes an illegal copy of a
music file or software application a “pirate,” therefore, is to import a sense of
stealing and uncontrollable lawlessness from the world of the sea into the world
of the Internet—even if the legal and factual circumstances are considerably
different.62
The idea of “innovation” contains three conceptual pieces—a status quo, a
new and different world, and the individual innovator who enables the transi-
tion.63  Implicit in this concept is the assessment that the new world is an
improvement on the old world in some way.  In the context of technology, the
improvements may come in the form of lower cost, increased efficiency or ease
58 I call them “important” for two reasons—they have the potential for significant legal
implications, and they bring powerful psychological contexts along with them.
59 See, e.g., Jason Power, Student Article, Maritime Terrorism:  A New Challenge for
National and International Security, 10 BARRY L. REV. 111, 112 (2008).
60 Id.
61 See generally Joshua Michael Goodwin, Universal Jurisdiction and the Pirate:  Time for
an Old Couple to Part, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 973 (2006) (describing and criticizing
the doctrine of universal jurisdiction in response to the problems posed by capturing pirates
in international waters).
62 Although a great deal of music and software piracy is international, the term is used just
as freely to characterize the actions of American citizens, acting entirely within the jurisdic-
tion of the laws of the United States.  Furthermore, as argued by many theorists, software
and music are public goods; thus, the concept of “stealing” is not directly relevant.
63 See, e.g., JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81-86 (3d
ed. Harper & Bros. 1950) (1942) (identifying the economic theory of “creative destruction”
in which a new, radical innovation upsets the existing market structure and replaces it with a
new paradigm).
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of use, or additional functionality.64  Innovation is related to, but distinct from,
invention, which lacks the concept of a “status quo,” and is more closely cen-
tered around the new “thing”—and which may, as a result, lack the same
associations of social improvement, creating allusions to the mad scientist bur-
ied in a basement creating new devices that may be useless, or even harmful, to
society.65  The Silicon Valley “dot-com” boom of the late 1990s established the
value of technology innovation, and the social and economic benefits affiliated
with innovation, a positive feeling that has persisted despite some amount of
economic normalization.66
“Privacy” is a powerful value in human society and in American culture in
particular.  From the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, to the decision ren-
dered by the United States Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,67 to
modern constitutional law,68 the law has long established the basic right of a
United States citizen to be secure and free from observation or control in their
homes and private lives.  The value of privacy is strongly protected outside the
United States as well.69  Privacy is becoming a more sensitive concept in the
modern world, where technology permits almost constant surveillance.70  On
the Internet, the problems of surveillance are even more prevalent, as the nature
of the network sends every message through the computing equipment of sev-
eral different companies, each of which is able to make a copy of information
passing through without detection by the sender or receiver.71
3. Property and Intellectual Property
Other scholars have previously studied specific types of framing in tech-
nology law.  One of the foremost of these studies involved analyzing the phrase
“intellectual property” (“IP”), and how inclusion of the word “property” may
be (partially) influencing legal development in IP, shifting it toward a greater
64 See Christopher Riley, The Need for Software Innovation Policy, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 589, 598-99 (2007) (discussing the value of software innovation).
65 See, e.g., Jessica Silbey, The Mythical Beginnings of Intellectual Property, 15 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 319, 330 (2008) (“[T]he language of conception and the stories told about
inventors still manifest the solo mad scientists flying kites in lightening-filled skies and
whose inventions appear like a cloud of smoke above their heads.”).
66 See, e.g., Po Bronson, Life in the Bust Belt, WIRED, June 2003, http://www.wired.com/
wired/archive/11.06/bust_belt.html.
67 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482, 485-86 (1965) (upholding a basic constitu-
tional right to privacy, though not contained within the literal text of the Bill of Rights).
68 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (striking down a Texas law
criminalizing sodomy on the grounds that “‘individual decisions by married persons, con-
cerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not intended to produce
offspring, are a form of “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment’”) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
69 See, e.g., Council Directive 2002/58, art. 3, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37, 37 (EC).
70 Consider the city of London, which in 2005 had more than 500,000 security cameras,
enough to film every person hundreds of times each day. E.g., Steve Stecklow et al., Watch
on the Thames:  Surveillance Cameras Monitor Much of Daily Life in London, May Help to
Identify Bombers, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2005, at B1.
71 See, e.g., Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance 6-7 (Univ. of Colo.
Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08-22), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1261344.
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exclusionary, more property/rights-based approach, instead of toward earlier
American doctrines of more limited rights.72  As powerful as the frame of
“property” in the context of IP can be, scholars have analyzed, discussed, and
considered the frame enough to have removed much of its effectiveness as a
frame.73  Therefore, I will not discuss it in detail in this Article.
4. Individual v. Industry
Technology law cases often define two worlds of opposing interests:  the
individual and the industry.  Frequently, a technology industry corporation
detects an individual doing something harmful to its fiscal bottom line and
chooses to invoke the legal system to stop the activity.74  Frames often align
themselves with one side or the other.  For example, “piracy” is a pro-industry
frame because it casts individuals as wrongdoers; “innovation” is a pro-individ-
ual frame in that it pits new innovators against incumbents;75 and “privacy” is
predominantly a pro-individual frame because it aligns with individual interests
in privacy more than business.  The individual/industry distinction is not, in
itself, of particular salience in an analysis of framing because both are too
generic to offer much rhetorical weight.  Nevertheless, given the centrality of
the David and Goliath stories to the technology movement, the distinction bears
mentioning.  The distinction shapes the public’s interpretation of news media
stories, or even the news media as they write their stories, having a powerful
(albeit indirect) effect on the strength of the associated frames and thus, on the
frames’ usefulness in technology law litigation.  To lend a more complete per-
spective on the issue, among my case studies are cases with holdings on both
sides of the individual/industry divide.76
72 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031, 1037-45 (2005) (interpreting the increasing propertization of copyright as a tran-
sition to a state in which copyright owners internalize all of the social value of their intellec-
tual property).
73 This is a sufficiently subtle point that I want to mention, although I cannot discuss it in
detail within the scope of this Article.  If judges are completely aware of framing activity in
briefs and oral arguments, it is possible that they will be able to filter a frame out of their
equitable/legal decision-making process.  A well-known and well-discussed frame, such as
“property” as a metaphor for IP, will more likely alert the judge that framing is happening,
and may raise too many property-related (but not case-related) cognitive structures, and may
not have as strong an effect.
74 See, e.g., Court Rules Against Song-Swappers, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
entertainment/4653662.stm (last visited May 18, 2009) (describing a successful prosecution
of users of file-sharing software in the UK).
75 At least in the context of copyright law, which usually pits an established industry capi-
talizing on its entrenched product lines against an individual developing a program that
undercuts the existing business models.
76 I characterize Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 341 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), as an “individual”
holding because it upholds the “privacy” frame against a corporate freedom frame, even
though both of the parties in the case were, essentially, individuals.  The Ninth Circuit hold-
ing in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd. (Grokster I), 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004),
vacated and remanded, 545 U.S. 913 (2005), is a pro-individual holding, and Davidson &
Associates v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005), and the Supreme Court holding in MGM
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd. (Grokster II), 545 U.S. 913 (2005), are both pro-industry hold-
ings. See infra Section II.B-C.
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II. OBSERVED FRAMING IN CASE STUDIES
A. Framing is Happening
In this section, I hope to demonstrate that framing in technology litigation
goes beyond serving as a minor component of an argument or a rhetorical
gloss.  Rather, it is a distinct, but implicit, form of argument, advocating a
particular equity balance.  Framing heavily influences a judge’s interpretations
of factual circumstances, statutory terminology, and case law precedent.  To
show this, I will examine a few recent cases that have dealt with active frames
in technology law.  For each case, I will analyze the appellate briefs submitted
by both parties and the final judicial opinion.  I will also identify framing argu-
ments within the briefs, and indications in the opinions that framing played a
significant role in the court’s decision.
A “framing argument,” as I use the term, is, at its heart, a rhetorical tool—
a use of language and of emphasis to associate the facts and the law of a case
with those of a frame to strengthen and support an argument.77  I will model a
framing argument in three parts.  The first part is the legal argument submitted
by a party.  In the cases examined in this Article, and in many other technology
law cases, the legal argument may take the form of advocating one of a set of
possible interpretations of ambiguities in statutory or technical terminology (or
both).78  The second part is the frame itself, modeled by the equity factors
associated with it (in terms of risks or benefits to some social good), and how
the equity factors are related to the facts at hand.79  Judges may be familiar
with some commonly known frames which offer built-in normative biases that
go beyond a mere presentation of the benefits and the risks to include a com-
plete balance and resolution.80  Finally, the third part of a framing argument is
the connection between the argument and the frame—the degree to which an
attorney can create an analogy between the equity weight of the frame and the
77 A frame, as discussed above, is a mental structure that exists in the mind of the reader and
acts as a sort of blueprint or guideline, one that encourages the reader to adopt a consistent
understanding of the context of the specific facts and law at hand. See supra Section I.A-B.
78 Consider, for example, the term “interoperability” in the DMCA’s reverse engineering
exception. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (2006).  This particular example involves ambiguities
both in the law (what sorts of technologies, and technological relationships, are this legal
term intended to encompass) and in the technology itself (do the particular technologies at
issue in any particular case fit within this legal categorization).
79 For example, the “piracy” frame connotes primarily risks—piracy of music or software
may severely damage the ability of copyright holders to enforce their exclusionary rights
over their creations, and may damage their ability to realize financial rewards, thereby dis-
couraging innovation.  The “innovation” frame, on the other hand, indicates benefits—inno-
vation in technology leads to improvements in our ability to produce, organize, and share
information.  Creating a relation between a frame and the facts at hand essentially involves
claiming that permitting the defendants’ activity would either worsen the risk, or increase the
benefit.
80 The example of piracy is again useful here, as it can be—and is—contended not just that
piracy may be a problem, but that it is, in fact, out of control in some sense, and that we need
to do whatever we can to stop it—the same sort of treatment “terrorism” received in the U.S.
after September 11, 2001.
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legal claim made in the argument.81  These three parts are independent, in the
sense that the legal argument needs to be plausible, the frame needs to be
strong and relevant, and the two must be tightly connected for a framing argu-
ment to be effective.
In the remainder of this section, I will examine various framing arguments
used in real appellate briefs.  The cases I discuss concern factual issues that
have powerful frames associated with them.   In some, David won, and in
others, Goliath.  My goal is to present a few examples of framing in action,
from a few different perspectives, to paint a credible picture of the activity.
B. Piracy v. Innovation
1. The Frame(s)
The concept of piracy in technology is familiar to a very broad audience.
The widespread sharing of popular music through peer-to-peer networks came
to the attention of the general public around the time of the Ninth Circuit case,
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.82  Early major media coverage took a gen-
erally neutral tone, but could not avoid suggesting there was a possibility this
was the start of a major, industry-wide destructive problem.83  The general
social norm at the time of Napster was that piracy and violations of copyright
law were “okay.”84  As the technology developed and the user base expanded,
the file-sharing market incorporated major motion pictures as well.85  The
81 To adopt the previous two examples:  the DMCA regulates some types of activity related
to piracy. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006) (prohibiting the circumvention of
technological protection measures).  In order to argue that an activity by one party violates
the DMCA, the opposing party can argue that the activity exacerbates the social problems
related to piracy.  The Davidson case is exactly of this form.
82 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).  The case concerned
the legality of the file-sharing program called Napster, which was the first peer-to-peer file
sharing program adopted by the general public. Id. at 1011.  The Napster program allowed
users to make available digital copies of songs for others to download, leading to widespread
(and illegal) exchange of copyrighted works. Id.
83 See, e.g., Amy Harmon, Anarchic E-Commerce:  Online Davids vs. Corporate Goliaths,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2000, § 4, at 1.  Just mentioning the claims of the music industry
introduces the thought of piracy:  “The program became so popular so fast that the major
record labels claim it has led to widespread music piracy, threatening their ability to turn a
profit and the incentive of artists to create music.” Id.  Harmon also quotes Esther Dyson, an
influential journalist, investor, and entrepreneur, as follows:  “We’re very much looking at a
biological model of an epidemic.” Id.  Harmon’s article further emphasizes the risk of a loss
of control:  “[C]ompanies that put information online, from music to books to software, may
have to resign themselves to relinquishing control over that material.” Id.
84 As discussed by Harmon, “[b]ased on what has become known as ‘peer-to-peer’ technol-
ogy, such services have vastly simplified the ability of individuals to trade files of any sort
among themselves, and to decide for themselves whether or not to obey copyright law.  Most
seem to be choosing the latter.” Id. at 16.
85 E.g., John Schwartz, Is Legal Action Against File Swappers Good Business?, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2003, at C1 (discussing the growing problems with piracy of major
Hollywood-produced movies).  Schwartz discusses two major differences between pirating
music and pirating movies:  movie files are much larger and harder to acquire by people with
slower Internet connections, and film industry insiders tend to distribute movie files over the
Internet to those who can acquire the movie files before their official release dates. Id. at
C3.
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introduction of subscription-based, legal downloading services began adjusting
the social norm and increasing the public perception of the illegality of unau-
thorized online copying.86  In the modern era, as legal challenges to file-sharing
networks advance (and succeed), and as social norms start to gradually change,
the recording industry repeats its mantra that, although the situation is improv-
ing, there is still a major problem.87
Less commonly known or understood is the counter-value or oppositional
frame in many piracy cases:  innovation.  One of the strongest counterargu-
ments to the piracy frame in its early days was that peer-to-peer, file-sharing
networks were an innovation—a new way of exchanging files and cultural
tastes, a valuable development in their own right, and perhaps a new and more
efficient vehicle for the organization of a music industry (or at least its distribu-
tion arm).88  Occasionally, this interpretation of file-sharing networks is
86 Neil Strauss, Online Fans Start to Pay the Piper:  Praise From Some for Subscription
Services to Download Music, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2002, at E1 (“These fans once scoffed at
the attempts by the record industry and others to create such subscription services, in which
users pay monthly fees for access to large online music libraries.  Now they are joining
them.”).  In addition, as set forth by Strauss,
Just six months ago, this sort of talk would have been unthinkable, downright apostasy,
among those who consider the giant recording conglomerates the bane of free-wheeling musical
access and innovation.  Even those who have been won over are usually still skeptical of the
power of the big corporations.  And there are still plenty of fans who think the subscription sites
are inferior, doomed to fail and maybe even intended to do so by their corporate sponsors.
But now, largely because of tough actions by the record companies to combat free music
sites through the courts, legislation and even through techno-guerrilla tactics, there is a noticea-
ble change of sentiment in a small segment of the downloading cognoscenti.
Id.
87 For example, in early 2005 the Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”)
expanded its fight to internal networks on university campuses.  RIAA, New Round of Law-
suits Against 717 Illegal File Sharers Includes Continued Focus On University Network
Users Who Illegally Download Music, Jan. 24, 2005, http://www.riaa.com/newsitem.php?
news_month_filter=1&news_year_filter=2005&resultpage=&id=6399292E-251A-E5E0-78
A0-D31AABAC6B66.  The fight remains ongoing today. See RIAA, Music, Movie Indus-
tries Target Theft On Internal Campus Networks, Apr. 27, 2006, http://www.riaa.com/new-
sitem.php?news_month_filter=4&news_year_filter=2006&resultpage=&id=AB7479C8-9B
38-921B-E724-254B76577CE9 (announcing a systematic program aimed at internal univer-
sity networks); RIAA, RIAA Launches New Initiatives Targeting Campus Music Theft, Feb.
28, 2007, http://www.riaa.com/newsitem.php?news_month_filter=2&news_year_filter=
2007&resultpage=&id=0BB7A35D-544B-2DD2-F374-4F680D6BAE9B (announcing new
initiatives in February 2007 to continue targeting music sharing within universities).  The
RIAA continues to keep a fresh list of the latest news on its war on piracy online. See
RIAA, Piracy:  Online and On the Street, http://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php (last vis-
ited May 18, 2009).  The RIAA did acknowledge that its victory at the Supreme Court in
Grokster II represented a major step forward, calling it a “milestone in the continuing trans-
formation of the online marketplace.”  RIAA, Music Industry Announces Grokster Settle-
ment, Nov. 7, 2005, http://www.riaa.com/newsitem.php?news_month_filter=11&news_
year_filter=2005&resultpage=2&id=81648953-2457-2877-94B4-D28C93625445.
88 This is essentially the “creative destruction” theory of Joseph Schumpeter, applied to the
music industry and piracy by Ku. See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of
Copyright:  Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263,
268-69 (2002) (applying Schumpeter’s “creative destruction,” in which capitalism pro-
gresses not through minor adjustments in efficiency or variety of production capabilities, but
through fundamental changes in economic models underlying the production).
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demonstrated in the media, but as part of a larger understanding of the Internet
as a source of social value.89  However, its media presence is much less than
that of piracy in the context of peer-to-peer file sharing, and thus, its connection
in public opinion is weaker.  Modern day efforts to strengthen the public signif-
icance of innovation, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s website on
the social value of innovation90 or the heavy emphasis on the risks to innova-
tors created by the Supreme Court’s decision in MGM v. Grokster,91 fall onto
already attentive ears.  Stories of an inconvenienced inventor cannot be as com-
pelling to a broad audience as piracy’s tales of the destruction of an industry.
Scholars of technology law, copyright law, and the First Amendment have
tussled for years over the optimal social balance between piracy and innova-
tion.  Most academics tend strongly to favor innovation.  Some of the legal and
quasi-legal rationales that support the rights of file-sharers include the First
Amendment,92 the notion of “fair use” within copyright law,93 and the support
for democracy and collective cultural control.94  Some of the equitable ratio-
nales in support of the rights of file-sharers include the study of the new pro-
duction environments made possible by peer-to-peer collaboration.95  Fewer
scholars stand on the other side, and the criticisms generally do not directly
support the music industry, but instead, criticize the legal rationales offered by
other academics.96  The level of understanding of the law and the technology of
file-sharing possessed by the average technology law scholar far exceeds that
of the average writer and reader of The New York Times and other major media
outlets.97  Therefore, the scholars’ collective opinion (that piracy has been
over-inflated as a social problem, and its counter values have been under-sup-
89 See, e.g., Steve Lohr, The Sharing Society;  In the Age of the Internet, Whatever Will Be
Will Be Free, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2003, § 4, at 1 (“The Net’s free-range design, combined
with the global proliferation of personal computing and low-cost communications networks,
laid the foundation for the surge of innovation and new uses that became so evident by the
late 1990’s.  The World Wide Web is the overarching example, but others include instant
messaging, online gaming and peer-to-peer file sharing.”).
90 Electronic Frontier Foundation, Innovation, http://www.eff.org/issues/innovation (last
visited May 18, 2009).
91 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster II), 545 U.S. 913 (2005); see, e.g., Fred
von Lohmann, Remedying ‘Grokster’, LAW.COM, July 25, 2005,  http://www.law.com/jsp/
article.jsp?id=1122023112436 (“The Court’s ruling leaves technology companies and their
attorneys to pick their way through a dangerous minefield of legal uncertainties.”).
92 See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use:  First Amendment Con-
straints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 358-59 (1999); Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 21-23 (2001).
93 E.g., Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1525, 1525 (2004).
94 Jack M. Balkin, Commentary, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture:  A Theory of
Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2004).
95 Yochai Benkler is perhaps the foremost academic studying the environment of “peer pro-
duction.” See YOCHAI BENKLER, Peer Production and Sharing, in THE WEALTH OF NET-
WORKS:  HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM ch. 3 (2006).
96 E.g., David McGowan, Why the First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy, 65
U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 290-91 (2004).
97 Professors Benkler, Madison, Balkin, and others spend a substantial amount of their time
dealing with technology law issues, to which the major media pay scant attention.
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ported in the legal system) ought to carry some weight, though accusations of a
leftist bias in the legal academy are hardly uncommon.98
As intelligent and well read as appellate judges are, they cannot be
expected to be knowledgeable of the latest scholarly debates in technology law
research, nor should they need to be aware of scholarship in the area, or to trust
its line in the equity sand.  Recent United States Supreme Court Justices such
as John Roberts and William Rehnquist, in particular, are known for their reti-
cence to cite or acknowledge scholarly opinion from any area of the law in their
holdings.99  Their hesitation means that two sources will continue to derive
judges’ primary understandings of the concepts of “piracy” and “innovation:”
law, including case precedents and statutory text, and The New York Times and
its ilk.  As I will discuss later in this Article, one of the defining features of
technology litigation is that the law does not have a whole lot to offer to resolve
many important and difficult legal questions—statutes and technologies are fil-
led with ambiguities the courts must resolve.100  Therefore, given the level of
major media coverage and the relative poignancy of the associated stories, the
piracy frame is much stronger than the innovation frame, and it will likely
come to be the driving force in cases which touch upon it.
The remainder of this section discusses, in detail, the use of framing in
three cases: Davidson & Associates v. Jung101 before the Eighth Circuit, and
MGM v. Grokster102 before both the Ninth Circuit and the United States
Supreme Court.103  The briefs for these cases include varying amounts of fram-
ing, based on piracy, innovation, or other frames, and connect with varying
success to the legal arguments and the facts at hand.  After presenting the briefs
submitted by both sides in each case, I will discuss the courts’ opinions, read-
ing from the language any indications that framing arguments influenced the
judges’ decisions.
2. Davidson v. Universal Associates
a. Background
Davidson & Associates v. Jung, also known informally as Blizzard v.
BnetD, concerns the video game company Blizzard and certain of its online
services.104  In conjunction with its video game business, Blizzard offers the
“Battle.net” online service, which enables users of Blizzard video games to
98 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, If the Law Is a Ass, the Law Professor Is a Donkey, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 28, 2005, § 4, at 4.
99 Posting of Orin Kerr to THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, http://volokh.com/posts/
1141777462.shtml (Mar. 7, 2006, 18:24 EST).
100 See infra Section III.A.
101 Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
102 MGM Studios, Inc.  v. Grokster Ltd. (Grokster I), 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004),
vacated and remanded, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
103 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster II), 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
104 Davidson, 422 F.3d at 633.  Full details on the case, including links to all court docu-
ments, are available through the Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”), who served as co-
counsel for the case. See EFF:  Blizzard v. BNETD, http://www.eff.org/IP/Emulation/Bliz-
zard_v_bnetd (last visited May 18, 2009).
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play against each other over the Internet.105  Among other features, the Bat-
tle.net service includes an authentication mechanism to prevent users from
playing pirated copies of the video games online.106  Out of frustration over
problems with the service, a group of Blizzard video game users developed
their own server software, “BnetD,” which replicated much of the functionality
of Blizzard’s official servers.107  As a result, users could play pirated copies of
Blizzard games online over a BnetD server.108  The BnetD designers were una-
ble to replicate the official service’s authentication mechanism, as Blizzard did
not make its detection process for illegal games available.109  Blizzard brought
suit against the software developers to enjoin the operation of the BnetD server,
alleging violations of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) and of
the license agreements for use of the Blizzard software.110  The programmers
of BnetD, in response, claimed their actions in creating the BnetD service con-
stituted reverse engineering to produce an interoperable product, and thus, were
in compliance with explicit protections for reverse engineering promulgated
under the DMCA.111  The district court ruled in favor of Blizzard on its motion
for summary judgment, holding the actions of the BnetD developers constituted
copyright infringement and thus did not qualify for the reverse engineering
exception.112  The district court also held the BnetD program constituted an
anti-circumvention device under the language of the DMCA.113
b. Appellants’ Brief
On appeal, the appellants, the BnetD developers, argued as follows:  fed-
eral copyright law preempted Blizzard’s breach of contract claims;114 the
DMCA’s exception for reverse engineering protected the BnetD developers;115
105 Opening Brief of Defendants-Appellants Internet Gateway, Inc., Tim-Jung, Ross Combs,
and Rob Crittenden at 4, Davidson, 422 F.3d 630 (No. 04-3654), 2005 WL 1467962 [herein-
after Brief of Davidson Defendants-Appellants].
106 Id. at 14.
107 Id. at 11-12.
108 Opposition Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 13, Davidson, 422 F.3d 630 (No. 04-3654),
2005 WL 1521191 [hereinafter Brief of Davidson Plaintiffs-Appellees] (noting, “the emula-
tor allows users without valid CD Keys to access online play and Battle.net Mode”).
109 Id. at 14-15.  Given the weakness of the authentication mechanism, widely publishing
this information would have made it easy for users of unauthorized copies of the games to
disguise their games as legitimate.  This is known, in the computer science community, as
“security through obscurity,” and many consider it to be unacceptably weak. See, e.g., Ste-
phanie Forrest et al., Building Diverse Computer Systems, in PROCEEDINGS: THE SIXTH
WORKSHOP ON HOT TOPICS IN OPERATING SYSTEMS 67, 71 (1997) (“Within computer secur-
ity there is widespread distrust of ‘security through obscurity’ . . . .”).
110 See Davidson & Assocs., Inc. v. Internet Gateway, Inc. (Gateway), 334 F. Supp. 2d
1164, 1167 (E.D. Mo. 2004) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2000)).
111 Id. at 1183-84.  The DMCA’s protections for reverse engineering are codified at 17
U.S.C. § 1201(f) (2006).  The programmers based their argument on a recent case upholding
this exception in the context of reverse engineering printer ink cartridges. See Brief of
Davidson Defendants-Appellants, supra note 105, at 55-58 (discussing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 550 (6th Cir. 2004)).
112 Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1184-85.
113 Id. at 1186-87.
114 Brief of Davidson Defendants-Appellants, supra note 105, at 19-29.
115 Id. at 40-52.
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and the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a prima facie case under the DMCA.116
The first claim does not fit as cleanly within the model of technology litigation
as the other two, and thus, I will focus purely on the DMCA claims.117  On the
prima facie claim, the appellants examined the requirements of liability as
defined by the DMCA—liability results from circumvention of a technological
protection measure that “effectively controls access” to a “[copyrighted]
work.”118  The appellants claimed their activities involved “Battle.net mode,”
and Battle.net mode was not a copyrighted work;119 in the alternative, appel-
lants argued that Battle.net mode was insufficiently controlled.120  On the
reverse engineering claim, the appellants argued (in particular) that their activi-
ties met the statutory exemption under the DMCA because their activities were
for the “sole purpose” of interoperability and did not constitute copyright
infringement.121
The appellants’ brief involved three distinct frames.  The first, “balance,”
infused claims that, in enacting the DMCA, Congress intended to create a bal-
ance of interests between the software companies and the reverse engineers,
and that a strong protection against circumvention is balanced in the statute by
a strong protection of fair use rights to reverse engineering.122  Appellants’
brief also implied that a larger balance, one that runs throughout the entire
Copyright Act, protected the actions of the appellants.123  “Balance” is a some-
what ephemeral frame, without the strong degree of rhetorical support that
characterizes piracy.
The second frame in appellants’ brief, “competition,” implied that the
motive behind Blizzard’s restrictions and legal activity was suspect, derived
from a desire to eliminate competition.124  Appellants supported this frame not
just by explicit reference, but by frequent tone painting, casting the BnetD
116 Id. at 52-58 (identifying two of the elements of establishing a prima facie case under the
DMCA, the existence of a copyrighted work and its effective protection by the mechanism,
and arguing that neither is present).
117 As will be discussed in detail in Section III, infra, my reason for focusing on technology
law in particular is that the newness of the statutes and the technologies involve ambiguities
that create room for framing to be particularly successful.  This particular legal claim is
based on much older law and a much different sort of legal construct, one in which framing
will not be as successful.  Although I am sure it still plays some role, I will focus instead on
the other two questions, which are exactly the sort for which I believe framing is a major
factor.
118 Brief of Davidson Defendants-Appellants, supra note 105, at 52-53 (citing 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a), (a)(2) (2000)).
119 Id. at 53-55.
120 Id. at 58-60.
121 Id. at 41-51 (discussing 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (2000)).
122 The implication is that siding against the appellants would disrupt “Congress’s carefully
crafted protections for fair use and especially fair use by reverse engineering[.]” Id. at 8.
123 This is addressed through frequent reference to 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006), which confers
fair use rights in general for copyright infringement. E.g., Brief of Davidson Defendants-
Appellants, supra note 105, at 17 (“Plaintiffs’ absolute ban on fair use completely under-
mines the explicit protections for fair use set forth in 17 U.S.C. §§ 107 and 1201(f).”).
124 See Brief of Davidson Defendants-Appellants, supra note 105, at 5 (“Yet while Plain-
tiffs cloak their claims in the rhetoric of piracy, this case has nothing to do with embracing or
facilitating piracy.  It has everything to do with Plaintiffs wanting to stifle competition in the
market for Internet game servers that work with its store-bought products . . . .”).
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developers as something like struggling freedom fighters trapped within an
oppressive autocratic regime.125  Competition is a powerful frame in certain
contexts—mergers and analyses of industrial practice at a higher level, and of
competition among established businesses—but has little purchase in technol-
ogy law, lacking the context-specific support of piracy.  There was also a battle
between the “competitor” label and the “pirate” label for the BnetD developers.
The nature of the competitor label (which is associated in the public mind with
large enterprises, such as AT&T and Microsoft, and not small companies, such
as Blizzard) just does not seem as apt as that of a pirate (which is associated
with amateurs, like the BnetD developers, opposing established corporations of
any size).
As for the most powerful frame at work in this case, there was little piracy
framing in the appellants’ brief.  Some anti-piracy framing can be found in the
brief’s attempt to argue the BnetD developers were mere victims of an anti-
competitive process.126  Appellants’ brief seemed to rely on “fair use” as its
primary conceptual defense against allegations of piracy, given the predomi-
nance of such language in the brief.127  There were some other instances of
“good guy” labels being applied to the developers—for example, casting the
BnetD project as an honest attempt at individual creation to solve the problems
the faceless corporate entity refused to correct.128  However, significant por-
tions of the brief were devoid of context or rhetoric, focusing instead on the
district court’s allegedly erroneous constructions of law or on technical discus-
sions of precedent.129
The legal claims offered by the appellants required specific constructions
of both the relevant technological activity and that of the DMCA.  To demon-
strate there was no prima facie case under the DMCA, appellants argued, as a
technical matter, that Battle.net mode was something different from the copy-
righted games, and moreover, copyright law did not protect Battle.net mode or
Battle.net mode was not effectively controlled.130  Appellants’ brief also
argued the court ought to have construed the DMCA so as not to protect the
sort of external mechanism of Battle.net mode and its anti-piracy features.131
As a legal matter, these readings are well within the range of plausibility.  Bliz-
zard’s games may be played without ever using Battle.net mode, and a court
could readily have interpreted that it did not deserve copyright protection.  Of
125 Consider the treatment of the End User License Agreement.  “[C]ustomers are forced to
accept [it] . . . .” Id. at 29.  “[I]n order to use any of Plaintiffs’ products or services, the
customer must surrender all rights to engage in the fair use of those products and services
. . . .” Id. at 30 (emphasis added).  “The purchaser has no choice other than to either accept
all the contractual terms that have been dictated by Plaintiffs or return the product.” Id.
(emphasis added).
126 E.g., Brief of Davidson Defendants-Appellants, supra note 105, at 5.
127 The opening of appellants’ brief emphasizes fair use (see Brief of Davidson Defendants-
Appellants, supra note 105, at 2-3), as does the opening of the summary of the argument, id.
at 16-17, and the opening of the section of the brief discussing the reverse engineering
exception, id. at 40-41.
128 Id. at 11-12.
129 See, e.g., id. at 31-37; id. at 55-57 (discussing Lexmark over a stretch of two and one-
half pages, a case with  which the judges were certainly familiar).
130 E.g., id. at 55.
131 Id. at 57-58.
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the frames advocated by the appellants in support of these constructions, com-
petition framing was not relevant, and balance framing was of only generic
application (and appellants failed to really emphasize such framing in their
brief, using it primarily for the § 1201(f) exception).  Anti-piracy framing
might have been effective if it could have persuaded the reader that the repli-
cated features of Battle.net mode did not “pirate” anything—but this ignores
the most significant element of the facts of the case, that the BnetD service
allowed users to play pirated copies.132
To show the § 1201(f) exception, appellants’ brief needed to construct
both the activities of the BnetD developers and the term “interoperability” in
the statute so that the statute encompassed the activities.  The statute’s lack of
clarity and the precedent of Lexmark International v. Static Control Compo-
nents, Inc.133 offered more than enough support for the Eighth Circuit to decide
to agree with the appellants on this point—though the Eighth Circuit chose not
to.134  Good “balance” framing supported this argument as well, if the brief had
effectively argued that a broad interpretation of the exception best served the
overall balance in copyright law and in the DMCA—but the vagueness and
arbitrariness of a “best balance” notion may have weakened the practical rhe-
torical value of such a framing argument.
c. Appellees’ Brief
The appellees’ brief, in pertinent part, contended as follows:  the BnetD
developers circumvented a technological handshake method;135 the handshake
method effectively protected a copyrighted work;136 and the circumvention was
not protected by the DMCA’s exception for reverse engineering for interoper-
ability.137  To establish the protected work constituted a copyrightable object,
appellees’ brief argued the handshake method protected “online play,” a com-
ponent of the game itself.138  Their brief defined the terms “sole purpose” and
“independently created” to keep the BnetD program out of the § 1201(f) excep-
tion;139 it also alleged the appellants’ activity constituted copyright infringe-
ment by incorporating code, files, and images into the appellants’ programs.140
As with the appellants’ brief, these arguments were, for the most part, plausible
as a legal matter—parties had never applied the terms to similar circumstances,
and though Lexmark seemed relevant, it was distinguishable if the court saw fit.
Beginning in the first paragraph of the Summary of the Argument, appel-
lees’ brief established piracy to be the core context for the case:  “[a]ll of [the
historic difficulties of widespread copying] changed in the computer age when
the availability of digital technology made it possible to make copies with
132 See, e.g., Brief of Davidson Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 108, at 13.
133 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 550 (6th Cir.
2004).
134 Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 640-41 (8th Cir. 2005) (discussing Lexmark
Int’l, 387 F.3d at 522, 528-29, 546-47).
135 Brief of Davidson Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 108, at 7-8.
136 Id. at 27-30.
137 Id. at 30-41.
138 Id. at 7-8.
139 Id. at 32-37.
140 Id. at 37-38.
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100% accuracy at virtually no cost.”141  The brief continued in the next para-
graph by implying the existence of a class of criminals, people who do not
respect the law, and by placing all those who would circumvent technological
protection measures into this class.142  The brief made explicit accusations later
on, alternatively accusing the appellants of piracy143 and of facilitating piracy
by others.144  The rest of the brief was filled with similar language—noting “its
games can be easily copied and distributed over the Internet,”145 offhandedly
referring to “unscrupulous individuals,”146 and describing the secret handshake
as a “digital lock Appellants picked.”147
The framing in appellees’ brief was both externally and internally strong,
and tightly linked to the arguments at hand.  The piracy frame, and its affiliated
economic and social problems, had been well established in the media.  The
brief referenced the piracy frame early and often, in many different contexts
and with many different targets and phrasings.148  The legal arguments con-
nected to the frame for several reasons:  the arguments gave the fundamental
justifications for the statutes as controlling piracy; they interpreted the statute’s
terms in a manner consistent with the description of the activities regulated as
piracy (and consistent with the actual activities of the defendants); and the
brief, as a whole, argued powerfully (as a policy matter) that siding with the
legal arguments would greatly reduce the amount of piracy and the resulting
loss.
d. The Eighth Circuit’s Opinion
As to the DMCA applicability issue, the Eighth Circuit made its decision
through direct textual interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a).149  The court cited
only one case on the subject of the DMCA, Lexmark, the strongest precedent in
support of appellants’ position, and a staple of their brief.150  The court distin-
guished Lexmark on somewhat spurious technical grounds, causing one to sus-
pect that the court did not entirely understand the technical subtleties of the
case.151  Beyond the distinction from Lexmark, the court said nothing in its
141 Id. at 15.
142 See id. at 16 (“[A]ll such technological measures are subject to circumvention, and the
type of person that circumvents such measures rarely pays attention to contractual restric-
tions.”) (emphasis omitted).
143 See id. at 22 (“While the DMCA was passed as a tool to prevent piracy, Appellants
attempt to use the DMCA to justify it.”).
144 See id. at 18-19 (“Appellants then further violated the DMCA by widely distributing
their circumvention device, and through their trafficking enabled rampant piracy of Blizzard
games by providing a means for online play of Blizzard games with no check for authentic-
ity.” ).
145 Id. at 7.
146 Id. at 8.
147 Id. at 25.
148 E.g., id. at 7-8 (incorporation multiple invocations of “legitimate” and “authorized” cop-
ies); id. at 11 (“hack value”); id. at 19 (“rampant piracy”).
149 Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 639-40 (8th Cir. 2005).
150 Id. at 640-41.
151 There are several examples of this.  First, the opinion refers to “Battle.net mode codes,”
id. at 641, a phrase that the court does not define and that is used exactly once in one of the
briefs. See Brief of Davidson Defendants-Appellants, supra note 105, at 61 (“Just as in
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rationale for its holding, other than “we are unpersuaded that summary judg-
ment on the anti-circumvention violations was improperly granted . . . .”152
The text of the opinion offered little in the way of substantive justification
behind the decision—the court had (or chose not to share) no compelling legal
reason to side with the appellees.
On the DMCA exception issue, the Eighth Circuit did not address the
majority of the complex issues raised by the parties.  Adopting a four-factor test
similar to that submitted by the appellants, the court discussed only the fourth
factor, offering a reiteration of a few of the facts of the case by way of support
for the legal conclusions that “[a]ppellants’s circumvention in this case consti-
tute[d] infringement” and “[a]ppellants failed to establish a genuine issue of
material fact as to the applicability of the interoperability exception.”153  As
with the DMCA applicability, the court’s opinion gave no real indication why it
ruled the way it did, and did not, in any way, refute the arguments submitted by
the appellants.
Offering little more than a mere paragraph for each issue when discussing
its holdings, the court did not say much about any specific frames.  In its dis-
cussion of the § 1201(f) exception, the court did not mention piracy or infringe-
ment, aside from the statement that the activity constituted copyright
infringement—the court merely noted the users could play unauthorized copies
of games on the BnetD servers, as if this was reason enough to justify infringe-
ment.154  In discussing whether appellees offered a prima facie case of
§ 1201(f) liability, the court used the same language as in its § 1201(f) discus-
sion, and only further offered a neutral factual statement that the “mode codes”
were not freely available.155
The court could plausibly have sided with either party, as both sides had
colorable legal arguments.  The most relevant precedent offered by either side,
the Supreme Court’s Lexmark decision, provided some inertia on behalf of the
Lexmark, no security device protects access to the Battle.net mode code in these ways and
no security device accordingly must be circumvented to obtain access to that program
code.”).  Second, the phrase “nor could data from the program be translated into readable
source code after which copies were freely available without some type of circumvention,”
Davidson, 422 F.3d at 641, is technically incorrect.  The circumvention did not occur in the
translation into readable source code by itself, but in the production of other code that
interfaced with features of Battle.net mode that ordinarily cannot be used without inputting a
‘CD Key.’  In addition, the court stated, “Appellants could not have obtained a copy of
Battle.net or made use of the literal elements of Battle.net mode without acts of reverse
engineering, which allowed for a circumvention of Battle.net and Battle.net mode.” Id.  The
first portion of this sentence could be technically correct, if the first use of “Battle.net” refers
to the source code that implements Battle.net mode in the client application, and if “the
literal elements of Battle.net mode” also refers to the same source code.  Any other interpre-
tation is factually incorrect, as of course Appellants, who owned legal copies of Blizzard
games, could access Battle.net mode and the official Battle.net servers without reverse engi-
neering.  The second portion of the quoted sentence is both ambiguous (in trying to declare
two separate pieces, Battle.net and Battle.net mode) and factually incorrect (the pieces them-
selves were not circumvented; the technological measures protecting them were
circumvented).
152 Davidson, 422 F.3d at 641.
153 Id. at 642.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 641.
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appellants, but it was certainly distinguishable.  The terms of the statute offered
very little guidance in their proper legal interpretation and application.  There
was no clear right side, and, as mentioned earlier, the opinion did not offer a
compelling legal rationale for why it chose one side over the other.  One possi-
ble explanation is that the judges were in fact motivated primarily by their
concerns about policy issues (notably, the fear of piracy), and structured their
opinion on sparse textualist legal rationale as an after-the-fact justification,
rather than a decisional process.
If policy concerns motivated the court’s decision, one difference in the
parties’ briefs that may explain why the judges decided in favor of the appel-
lees is that the framing in the appellants’ brief was demonstrably worse than the
framing in the appellees’ brief.  The appellants’ brief emphasized the weaker
frames of “balance” and “competition,” and it began with its most technical
legal argument (preemption), which left little to no room for effective framing,
leaving it far behind the powerful framing of the appellees’ brief.  Appellants
could have greatly improved the framing in their brief by focusing on a single
frame, such as “balance,” and by emphasizing the legal arguments that are most
amenable to framing, notably the claim of § 1201(f) exception.  Although such
a presentation in appellants’ brief would not have guaranteed them a victory,
the legal issues in the case were flexible enough that concentrating on one
strong frame may have made a considerable difference.
3. MGM v. Grokster, Before the Ninth Circuit
a. Background
The well-known case of MGM v. Grokster concerns the issue of secondary
liability for copyright infringement as applied to developers of software for
peer-to-peer networking.156  The defendants were (primarily) two companies,
Grokster Ltd. and Streamcast Networks, Inc., who produce and distribute (or
rather, produced and distributed) the Grokster and Morpheus software pro-
grams, without charge, which enabled users to send and receive files from other
users.157  The plaintiffs, owners of a large share of the copyrighted material
exchanged over the networks, brought suit against the software distributors to
hold them liable for vicarious and contributory copyright infringement, seeking
an injunction and damages.158  The plaintiffs alleged (without strong opposi-
tion) the online exchange of their material constituted copyright violation, and
the defendants knew a portion of the use of their software was for illegal activ-
ity.159  In effect, plaintiffs argued the knowing distribution of software that
facilitated illegal activity was sufficient to trigger secondary liability on behalf
of the defendants.160  The district court disagreed, granting summary judgment
in favor of the defendants on the grounds that neither contributory nor vicarious
liability applied to the activities of the software companies.161  The plaintiffs
156 MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd. (Grokster I), 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated
and remanded, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
157 Id. at 1159-60.
158 Id. at 1158.
159 Id. at 1160.
160 See id.
161 Id.
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appealed and brought the question of the scope of secondary liability as applied
to the defendants before the Ninth Circuit.162
b. Appellants’ Brief
On appeal, the appellants argued the district court erred and the defendants
met the legal requirements of both contributory liability (knowledge and contri-
bution) and vicarious liability (financial benefit and control).163  The brief chal-
lenged, as a matter of law, the district court’s construction of the specific
requirements of knowledge, material contribution, and control.164  The case law
in this area is far from clear about what level of knowledge, contribution, and
control are necessary to trigger liability, and the technology comparisons to
past determinations of secondary liability (see, e.g., A&M Records v. Nap-
ster)165 are not sufficiently close to permit a direct application.  The formal
legal arguments, by themselves, are not convincing, the supporting case law is
unclear, and the inertia was in favor of the appellees.  The court would need to
import considerations of equity into its decision to interpret the law in favor of
the appellants.
To supplement the legal arguments submitted by the appellants, some
framing language can be found in their brief—but not much.  The primary
frame at work in appellants’ brief was piracy.  The acts of the users of the
software clearly constituted piracy in its modern day sense, and imputing that
to the software developers (at least on a rhetorical level) might have been very
helpful.  The brief contained some accusations of this sort.  It compared the
activities of Grokster and Morpheus users to those of Napster users.166  Appel-
lants’ brief contained significant technical description of the defendants’ activi-
ties, in an attempt to support appellants’ claims of contribution and control.167
Moreover, their brief hinted (though in only a few places) that the fate of the
music industry required a determination that the defendants’ activities were
illegal.168
Overall, however, the level of the use and implementation of framing
arguments in appellants’ brief was low.  Their brief did not often use loaded
terms such as “pirate” or “piracy;” the first instance of either of these terms
comes at the very end of a lengthy statement of facts (without any mention in
the introduction, for example).169  The brief engaged in far more detailed tech-
nical description than it did baseless name-calling.170  Moreover, when appel-
lants used framing, they tended to focus more on the activities of the users of
162 Id. at 1157.
163 MGM Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Opening Brief at 23-25, Grokster I, 380 F.3d 1154 (Nos.
03-55894, 03-56236, 03-55901), 2003 WL 22794496 [hereinafter Brief of Grokster I Plain-
tiffs-Appellants].
164 Id.
165 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
166 See, e.g., Brief of Grokster I Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 163, at 5, 8-10.
167 Id. at 44-48, 56-58.
168 Id. at 2 (“All of that is at risk in this lawsuit.”); id. at 6 (“[Affirming the decision below]
will gravely threaten any possibility for meaningful copyright protection in the digital era.”).
169 Id. at 22 (“It is easy to find any type of pirated media on Defendants’systems.”).
170 See, e.g., id. at 11-15, 27-29.
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the software instead of the developers,171 weakening its relevance to the legal
question at hand.  The brief, overall, was very “clean”—it stuck to the law, to
the legal precedents, and to the facts at hand.  In this Article, I hope to raise at
least a suspicion that this may be why the appellants lost.
c. Appellee’s Brief
Appellee Grokster argued that neither theory of secondary liability applied
to them, and the Sony exception protected the activities of the defendants.172
Although scholars debate its exact interpretation, the early precedent of Sony
Corporation v. Universal City Studios173 established that, at a minimum, con-
tributory copyright liability does not hold liable the creators of a device, which
can be used for copyright infringement if a “substantial” portion of the actual
use of the device is for non-infringing purposes.174  Appellee’s brief centered
around the argument that the defendants’ activities were protected under Sony
and were generally legitimate innovations completely removed from the
infringing activities of the users.175
The framing in appellee’s brief was tricky, and one must proceed on mul-
tiple levels to analyze the framing.  Piracy was obviously a strong frame, but
the appellee had to advocate a sort of “anti-piracy” frame and argue that piracy
was not an accurate analogue of the facts of the case at hand.  For example, the
brief discussed the legitimate, and socially valuable, uses of the software.176  It
mocked the paranoia and world ending claims of the industry.177  Even further,
the brief emphasized the legitimate and compliant activities of the defendants
to make them seem as blameless as possible.178  Less common frames used in
appellee’s brief included “innovation”179 and “balance.”180  The brief com-
pared the Grokster software to other historic music technologies, each of which
people first saw as potentially harmful, yet permitted to flourish, and ulti-
mately, the technologies turned out to be beneficial.181  Appellee also intro-
duced balance explicitly late in their brief as a description of the then current
state of the law of secondary copyright liability after the Sony decision.182
Moreover, as balance is only a good thing if one’s interpretation of the law is
171 See, e.g., id. at 3-4.
172 See, e.g., Appellee Grokster, Ltd.’s Brief at 25-26, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd.
(Grokster I), 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (Nos. 03-55894, 03-55901), 2003 WL 22753806
[hereinafter Brief of Grokster I Appellee].
173 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.  464 U.S. 417 (1984).
174 Id. at 442.
175 See, e.g., Brief of Grokster I Appellee, supra note 172, at 37, 50.
176 See id. at 3-5, 19-22.
177 Id. at 28-29.
178 Id. at 13.
179 Id. at 7, 50.
180 Id. at 46-47.
181 Id. at 28-29.  Innovation framing is also present later in appellee’s brief, where the
appellee argued the appellants were trying to redesign Grokster’s software, effectively
allowing copyright owner control over the shape of technological innovation. Id. at 49-50.
182 Id. at 46 (“Drawing that line [between legal and illegal activity] preserves the careful
balance inherent in the Copyright Act:  to reward creative effort only as a means to
encourage the development of the ‘useful arts and sciences.’”) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8).
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seen as a better balance than the other side’s, the brief contended the appellants
were engaging in frivolous litigation,183 and were trying “to legislate the shape
of technological innovation” by changing the settled structure of liability.184
Compared to the appellants’ brief, the framing in the appellee’s brief, as a
general matter, was more closely connected to the activity of the defendants
and not the users of the network, which strengthened the connection of the
frame to the appellee’s legal arguments.  The appellee’s brief managed to
establish a close factual analogy between the facts of the case at hand and the
facts of Sony because the brief focused on the analogy rather than technical
legal details.  The appellants’ brief, by contrast, attacked the illegal activities of
the users through some amount of framing, but imputed this activity to the
defendants through a dry legal analysis of the doctrinal details of knowledge,
contribution, and control.  In general, the appellee’s brief was less technical and
more emotional than the appellants’ brief, and a better picture that the other
side was more disruptive of the existing social balance.  In short, appellee did a
far better job of framing.
d. The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion
The Ninth Circuit’s (very technical) opinion gave sparse overt mention to
piracy or balance or any other frame, focusing instead on the Sony precedent
and the elements of contributory and vicarious copyright liability185—almost
mirroring the form of the appellants’ brief.  The case might have been as simple
as the opinion made it out to be.  For example, when considering vicarious
liability, the court held the legal requirement of control was not met because, as
a technological matter, Grokster could not effectively block access to users (as
there was no centralized login process) and could not filter traffic (because files
did not pass through central servers where they could be observed).186  This
holding seemed straightforward, and it was defensible—it took a narrow read-
ing of the secondary liability standard, one that upheld the spirit of Sony, and
one that affirmed the finding of the district court.  However, the opinion did not
adequately address the arguments in appellants’ brief, which noted that users
could easily modify the software to include filters for common copyrighted
files,187 made easier by the already existing capacity to force users to upgrade
software to the newest version to continue using the network.188  Though this
feature was not the same as central filtering, it was arguably equivalent in func-
tion.  Given the ambiguities in the terminology and technology, there is some
reason to believe the legal merits of the case were not the sole factor behind the
court’s decision.  There must have been more to the story than is told by a mere
recitation of the court’s interpretations of the legal factors.
Some of the case’s hidden story is evident in the court’s opinion and in the
frames the court referenced.  The court opened by criticizing a long history of
183 See, e.g., id. at 36-37.
184 Id. at 7.
185 See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd. (Grokster I), 380 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th
Cir. 2004).
186 Id. at 1165.
187 Brief of Grokster I Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 163, at 16-19.
188 Id.
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copyright owner resentment of (and legal challenges to) any fundamental
change in the technology of the music business.189  The court returned to this
theme at the very end of the opinion when it adopted the appellees’ contention
that the appellants sought to change the established state of the law of secon-
dary liability.190  The opinion recited the story of the band Wilco’s use of file-
sharing networks to beat the system by creating a commercial demand for an
album that its recording studio had refused to produce (thinking the album
would have no commercial demand).191  If nothing else, the court clearly
acknowledged the software permitted legitimate use.192
It is not a certainty that the Ninth Circuit sided with the appellees because
of their stronger framing, as opposed to the merits of the pure legal arguments,
or any predilection on the part of the individual judges toward the parties or the
industries from experience, or any other factor or combination of factors.193
Notwithstanding, I hope I have raised a little suspicion, and that, viewed along-
side the Supreme Court’s resolution of the same case, discussed below, the
importance of framing is made clear.
4. Grokster, Before the Supreme Court
a. Background
The recording industry and motion picture studio companies petitioned for
a writ of certiorari in late 2004, alleging that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation
189 Grokster I, 380 F.3d at1158 (“From the advent of the player piano, every new means of
reproducing sound has struck a dissonant chord with musical copyright owners, often result-
ing in federal litigation.  This appeal is the latest reprise of that recurring conflict . . . .”).
190 Id. at 1166 (“The Copyright Owners urge a re-examination of the law in the light of
what they believe to be proper public policy . . . .  [I]t would also alter general copyright law
in profound ways with unknown ultimate consequences outside the present context.”).
191 Id. at 1161.
192 Id. at 1162 (“In this case, the Software Distributors have not only shown that their
products are capable of substantial non-infringing uses, but that the uses have commercial
viability.”) (footnote omitted).
193 Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth’s “attitudinal model” is one of the more recent compre-
hensive behavioral theories that purports to explain the Supreme Court and other judicial
decisions on the basis of non-legal criteria. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002). See generally Pra-
tibha A. Dabholkar, Incorporating Choice into an Attitudinal Framework:  Analyzing Mod-
els of Mental Comparison Processes, 21 J. CONSUMER RES. 100, 100-18 (1994) (examining
the attitudinal model outside the scope of judicial decision making); Howard Gillman,
What’s Law Got to Do with It?  Judicial Behavioralists Test the “Legal Model” of Judicial
Decision Making, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 465, 470-71 (2001) (reviewing HAROLD J.
SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL:  ADHERENCE TO PRECE-
DENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999)) (referencing and briefly summarizing many
older behavioral theories).  As applied to judicial decision making, Segal and Spaeth’s attitu-
dinal model holds that the Supreme Court made some decisions in large part because of the
ideological views of the justices. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra, at 86.  It is well recognized that
Ninth Circuit decisions are overturned more often than those of other appellate courts, with
explanations including its large size, see Richard A. Posner, Is the Ninth Circuit Too Large?
A Statistical Study of Judicial Quality, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 711, 718-19 (2000), its recent
ideological leanings, and some of its procedural rules, see Kevin M. Scott, Understanding
Judicial Hierarchy:  Reversals and the Behavior of Intermediate Appellate Judges, 40 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 163, 169 (2006).
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of Sony involved a severe misreading of secondary liability law, and the deci-
sion created a split with the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in In re Aimster Copyright
Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1107 (2005).194
Apparently, many members of the general public also felt the decision ought to
be reviewed, as briefs in support of certiorari were filed by law professors, the
attorneys’ general of forty states, other entertainment organizations, including
major sports and software associations, and a small collection of high profile
(though mostly older) music artists.195  In addition, the entirety of the Supreme
Court agreed, unanimously voting to vacate and remand the Ninth Circuit’s
decision.196
b. Petitioners’ Brief
At a broad level, the petitioners argued that secondary liability applied to
the activities of the defendants regardless of the Sony safe harbor.197  More
specifically, the brief contended the Ninth Circuit’s construction of the Sony
safe harbor introduced an erroneous requirement of specific knowledge into the
standard for contributory liability,198 and the non-infringing uses of the Grok-
ster program were not sufficient to excuse liability.199  By digging a little
deeper into the Ninth Circuit’s rationale for Sony, the brief also found support
for the claim that the Supreme Court could make a legal distinction between the
mere offering of software for download and the active encouraging of the use
of the software for infringing activity.200  This last theory found the most sup-
port in the eventual opinion rendered by the Supreme Court.  The brief’s argu-
ments were very defensible, though, of course, even if the Ninth Circuit’s
construction of Sony was erroneous, and even if the Supreme Court could make
a distinction for active infringement, these do not resolve what was an ambigu-
ous legal standard, and could not support a formal legal verdict absent any
considerations of equity.
As with the other cases I have discussed, the use of framing heavily
swayed the equity considerations in Grokster.  The volume of framing on dis-
194 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2-3, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd. (Grok-
ster I), 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 543 U.S. 1032 (2004) (No. 04-480).
195 All these briefs are available from the EFF’s case archive.  EFF:  MGM v. Grokster,
http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM_v_Grokster/ (last visited May 18, 2009).
196 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster II), 545 U.S. 913, 916 (2005).  I am not
claiming that the Supreme Court’s nine-to-zero verdict was a result of framing; there was, in
fact, plausible concern over the Ninth Circuit’s construction of Sony.  Certainly, however, I
suspect the more effective use of framing played a role in the nature of the Supreme Court’s
response, particularly in its decision to create a new theory of liability based on the intent of
the developers, to focus on the real pirates.
197 See, e.g., Brief for Motion Picture Studio and Recording Company Petitioners at 18,
Grokster II, 545 U.S. 913 (No, 04-480), 2005 WL 166587 [hereinafter Brief for Grokster II
Petitioners] (“Sony-Betamax provides no safe harbor where, as here, a defendant engages in
conduct that encourages or assists infringement, or intends to facilitate it.”).  The Sony safe
harbor protects from contributory liability the developers of devices that are capable of sub-
stantial non-infringing use. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
442 (1984); supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
198 See, e.g., Brief for Grokster II Petitioners, supra note 197, at 38-42.
199 Id. at 30-38.
200 Id. at 27-29.
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play in petitioners’ brief was staggering.  The vast majority of it dealt with the
piracy frame, which was central to the discussions of peer-to-peer networks.
The brief used powerful rhetoric, aimed at the software developers directly,
instead of the users, to make its accusations—“perpetual free pass to inflict
these harms because a tiny fraction of the material available on their services
may not be infringing”201 and “[c]opyright infringement is the lifeblood of
these businesses”202 being two of the stronger examples.203  Although petition-
ers did not often use the specific terms “pirate” and “piracy,” petitioners did
implement the terms “infringement” and “infringing” enough to compensate—
sixteen times in the first five paragraphs of the brief’s Statement of the Case.204
The pattern continued in later sections; for example, one single paragraph in the
Summary of the Argument used the terms “infringement” and “infringing” ten
times.205  Although petitioners reduced the vehemence of the rhetoric in the
more detailed Argument section, the framing remained evident.206
Piracy framing was not the only type of framing petitioners used in their
brief.  Petitioners also twisted the frames of innovation and balance introduced
by the respondents’ brief to the Ninth Circuit.  Where the respondents advo-
cated for the innovation of their software, the petitioners advocated for the
value of “innovation in legitimate copyright commerce”207 and argued the
innovation of peer-to-peer networking was “innovation of a most unwelcome
kind.”208  Petitioners argued the respondents were the ones actually attempting
to twist the legal status quo by trying to create a “distortion of traditional prin-
ciples of copyright law”209 and claimed the Ninth Circuit set balance aside and
“denied petitioners any possibility of ‘effective protection’ of their copyrighted
works in the digital era.”210  This glorified version of the elementary school
child’s “I know you are but what am I” argument is in fact a potentially valua-
ble psychological argument given the underlying, unresolved normative ques-
tions involved in legal determinations concerning the scope of secondary
liability.
However, the piracy framing served as the petitioners’ greatest weapon in
their brief.  Unlike their brief before the Ninth Circuit, framing language was
present and strong throughout their brief submitted to the Supreme Court.  The
petitioners’ Supreme Court brief directed accusations of improper activity at
201 Id. at 1.
202 Id. at 3.
203 Other standouts included “contribute to copyright infringement on a ‘mind-boggling’
scale,” id. at 1; “exploit this massive infringement for profit,” id.; and “breeding grounds for
copyright infringement of unprecedented magnitude,” id. at 3.
204 Id. at 1-4.  Naturally, some amount of discussion of infringement was necessary, as it
was the legal issue at hand; a few uses of the term “infringement” would not have indicated
significant framing.  However, I contend the petitioners intended to invoke the frame of
piracy through the blatant overuse of these words.
205 Id. at 17-18.
206 Consider, for example, the accusation that the software produced by the defendants was
“principally used for infringement, and it is this infringement—not legitimate activity—that
makes them money.” Id. at 23.
207 Id. at 41.
208 Id. at 49.
209 Id. at 50.
210 Id. at 2.
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the respondents and the developers, not at the third party users.  The brief con-
tained less technical discussion of both the law and the technology, focusing
more on the framing.  In addition, petitioners more closely aligned their legal
argument to framing by arguing the trigger for liability was developer encour-
agement instead of the proportion of illegitimate activity by the users, or any-
thing as neutral as “knowledge” of the infringing activity.
c. Respondents’ Brief
Respondents’ legal argument tracked, in part, the Ninth Circuit’s decision,
and in part, the arguments of the petitioners’ brief.  It began by arguing that
Sony did in fact protect the activities of the respondents.211  It then decried the
petitioners’ interpretation of Sony on both legal and equitable grounds.212
Respondents also challenged the attachment of encouragement to secondary
liability on procedural grounds.213  Finally, their brief argued the petitioners
were attempting to change the law, and any change could and must come from
Congress, not the courts.214  These are fully rational arguments, though they
relied on both equity and on one particular philosophy of jurisprudence, in that
change to this area of law ought to come from Congress and not the courts.  As
a formal matter, respondents’ brief remained stronger than petitioners’ brief, as
it advocated upholding district and appellate constructions of precedent or, in
the alternative, recognized the law was unclear and deferred to Congress to
declare illegality.
The respondents’ brief included less framing than their earlier brief before
the Ninth Circuit, or than the petitioners’ brief to the Supreme Court.  Nonethe-
less, it still displayed a wealth of balance, innovation, and piracy frames.  The
balance and innovation framing occurred predominantly at the middle and latter
portions of the brief, after the introductory sections.  For example, at the end of
Section I of the Argument, respondents included a detailed discussion of the
harm to innovation if the Supreme Court found the defenders liable;215 respon-
dents implemented the first reference to the notion of balance in the beginning
of their Argument.216  As with the petitioners’ brief, the majority of the framing
in the respondents’ brief concerned piracy.  Some of this framing took the form
of emphasizing the valid uses of the software to weaken the piracy label;217
some involved claiming the petitioners’ arguments were inflated and para-
211 Brief for Respondents at 21-26, MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster II), 545
U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480), 2005 WL 508120 [hereinafter Brief for Grokster II
Respondents].
212 Id. at 26-30.
213 See the title of the relevant section:  “Claims Of Contributory Infringement Liability For
Urging Infringement Or Assisting Specific Known Acts Of Infringement Are Not Before
This Court.” Id. at 34-37.
214 Id. at 40-50.
215 Id. at 31-33.  There is a shorter discussion of innovation early in the brief, however, in
the “Statement” section. Id. at 2 (“The suggested changes in the general law of secondary
liability would profoundly impair Sony’s essential protection of product innovation, to the
detriment of future creators among others.”).
216 Id. at 16-17.
217 Id. at 6-8.
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noid;218 and some attempted to separate the illegitimate activities of the users
from the activities of the developers.219  At one point, the respondents’ brief
appeared to argue piracy was not the right view and, instead, the entire situation
should be viewed as the re-forming of a market, citing Joseph Schumpeter for
support.220
Though framing was present in the respondents’ brief, it was not as vehe-
ment, nor as frequent, as the framing in the petitioners’ brief.  The framing
largely occurred in the latter parts of the brief instead of the earlier parts
(whereas earlier framing better shapes the judge’s interpretation of later, more
technical, legal arguments).  Respondents’ did not closely connect their legal
arguments to the framing, as the arguments were (at least in part) procedural
and jurisprudential, instead of fact-based.  There were also small details within
many uses of framing that weakened the arguments.  Consider the discussion of
innovation at the end of the respondents’ brief—it examined the cost of innova-
tion, not the value, implying the Supreme Court’s decision would not really
cause any major harm, but would simply provide a minor disincentive for inno-
vators.221  Much worse was the fact there were two possible, though contradic-
tory, interpretations of the attempts in the brief at anti-piracy framing.  In
theory, a piracy frame might be weakened by indicating that the users who
wished to commit copyright infringement had many options, lessening the cul-
pability of developers.222  However, this argument reinforces the magnitude of
the underlying problem (piracy), and makes the claims of disaster submitted by
the petitioners seem more realistic.  The respondents’ arguments of judicial def-
erence could then be applied here—when in doubt, let the courts fix the imme-
diate harm (the damage caused to the movie and music industries by piracy),
and if major change (such as a change in the market structure of the entertain-
ment industry) was to be made, let it be made by Congress.
d. The Supreme Court’s Opinion
The Supreme Court’s opinion adopted, in its entirety, the inducement the-
ory advocated by the petitioners.  The inducement theory attaches secondary
liability to individuals who both distribute a device and induce the use of the
device to infringe copyright.223  The Court acknowledged it was making a
deliberate change to the common law of secondary liability by adopting this
rule.224  The Court refused to clarify the proper scope of Sony’s exemption,
218 Note the use of the phrase, “sky-is-falling pleas,” to characterize the recording industry’s
concerns. Id. at 15.
219 Id. at 2-6.
220 Id. at 24-25 & n.12 (citing JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND
DEMOCRACY 84 (Harper-Perennial ed. 1976) (1942)).
221 Id. at 31-33.
222 The brief attempts to do this in its opening sections. See id. at 2-4.
223 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster II), 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005).
224 Id. (“We adopt it here, holding that one who distributes a device with the object of
promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative
steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third
parties.”).
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simply stating the Ninth Circuit’s construction was incorrect.225  The opinion
demonstrated a striking amount of technical commentary, including discussions
of Grokster’s functionality and its beneficial uses.226  A considerable portion of
the opinion was devoted to factual matters—the activities of the respondents,
including the development of the software, marketing activities, and the design
of respondents’ business models.227  After the Court finished reciting the facts
at hand, the remainder of the opinion followed standard forms, mixing discus-
sion of various legal precedents with commentary on the parties’ arguments.228
The Supreme Court’s opinion contained signs of warm receptions of both
piracy and balance-centered framing.  The piracy framing argument by the peti-
tioners was on display early in the factual discussion of the opinion, when the
Court noted, “each [of the respondents] took active steps to encourage infringe-
ment;”229 using the respondents’ advertising to Napster users as support for this
claim reinforced the Court’s connection.230  Although both parties argued their
side represented the more balanced view of the equities, the Court reflected the
conception offered by the petitioners, emphasizing there was a great deal of
infringing uses and it may have been impossible to catch the infringers directly,
necessitating the restrictions on innovation that concerned the respondents.231
The Court claimed to place a great deal of value on preserving this balance.232
For whatever reason, the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit differed on
their legal interpretations of Sony and their understandings of what secondary
liability for copyright infringement should look like.  Though this type of judi-
cial disagreement is not exactly rare,233 the framing in the parties’ briefs pro-
vided a clear distinction between the cases, offering one reason why the two
courts may have reached such different interpretations on the same legal ques-
225 Id. at 934 (“[W]e do not revisit Sony further, as MGM requests, to add a more quantified
description of the point of balance between protection and commerce when liability rests
solely on distribution with knowledge that unlawful use will occur.  It is enough to note that
the Ninth Circuit’s judgment rested on an erroneous understanding of Sony and to leave
further consideration of the Sony rule for a day when that may be required.”).
226 Id. at 919-22.
227 Id. at 921-25.
228 See, e.g., id. at 932-33.
229 Id. at 924.
230 Id. at 925 (“The evidence that Grokster sought to capture the market of former Napster
users is sparser but revealing, for Grokster launched its own OpenNap system called Swaptor
and inserted digital codes into its Web site so that computer users using Web search engines
to look for ‘Napster’ or ‘[f]ree file sharing’ would be directed to the Grokster Web site
. . . .”).
231 Id. at 929-30 (“When a widely shared service or product is used to commit infringement,
it may be impossible to enforce rights in the protected work effectively against all direct
infringers, the only practical alternative being to go against the distributor of the copying
device for secondary liability on a theory of contributory or vicarious infringement.”) (citing
In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645-46 (7th Cir. 2003)).
232 Id. at 928 (“The more artistic protection is favored, the more technological innovation
may be discouraged; the administration of copyright law is an exercise in managing the
tradeoff.”).
233 Ninth Circuit decisions are reversed far more than decisions rendered from sister Cir-
cuits. See Scott, supra note 193.
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tion.234  Although the petitioners’ legal arguments were not inherently convinc-
ing, the Supreme Court’s rationale in its opinion seemed to track, in form and
substance, the petitioners’ framing.
C. Privacy
1. The Frame
Privacy in the digital era has engendered even more major media attention
than piracy.235  Privacy reaches a broader audience than concerns over piracy.
Although many Americans listen to music produced by the recording industry,
the potential financial damage to the industry from piracy affects individuals
only indirectly, whereas the fear of a corporation collecting and studying
purchasing behavior236 or reading personal email237 strikes closer to heart.
Federal statutes, such as the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”),238 the Wire-
tap Act,239 and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”),240 protect spe-
cific and willful acts of improper use of information.  However, other issues,
including the use of data mining for quasi-legal collection and the use of per-
sonal information for business purposes,241 remain ungoverned, and lead to
continued development of the privacy frame.  Additional state and federal stat-
utes protect the specific personal information of greatest concern, such as credit
card information242 and medical records,243 though advocates for the public
interest in privacy policy claim that these laws still fail to adequately address
234 Naturally, this is not the only possible reason.  Different courts are predisposed toward
different equity balances and judicial philosophies.  A successful framing argument before a
“liberal” court, such as the Ninth Circuit, may not be as successful before another Circuit
Court.  However, this does not obviate my theory, as it merely affects the selection of frames
and legal arguments available to adopt.
235 Although this is perhaps a subjective statement, some trite objective evidence can none-
theless demonstrate my point.  For example, a Lexis-Nexis search through The New York
Times archives for “privacy w/10 digital,” conducted on November 22, 2008 returned 153
results, whereas a search for “piracy” and “peer” returned only 121 results.
236 See, e.g., Steve Lohr & John Markoff, Computing Centers Become the Keeper of Web’s
Future, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1999, at A1.
237 See, e.g., Saul Hansell, The Internet Ad You Are About to See Has Already Read Your E-
Mail, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2004, at C1.
238 Stored Communications Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 201, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860-68 (1986)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2006)).
239 Wiretap Act, Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 801-804, 82 Stat. 197, 211-25 (1968) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006)).
240 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, § 2, 100 Stat. 1213, 1213-
16 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006)).
241 See generally MICHAEL J.A BARRY & GORDON S. LINOFF, DATA MINING TECHNIQUES:
FOR MARKETING, SALES, AND CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT (2d. ed. 2004).
242 For example, California Senate Bill 1386 (made active on July 1, 2003) targeted “per-
sonal information” stored on a computer server.  The California Legislature incorporated the
bill into California Civil Code, sections 1798.29, 1798.82, and 1798.84. See CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 1798.29, .82, .84 (West 2008).
243 The most significant law in this context is the federal Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) and its “Privacy Rule.” See HIPPA, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of Titles 18, 26, 29, and 42
of the United States Code); 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2008). See also The Privacy Rule, http://
www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa/finalreg.html (last visited May 22, 2009).
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major problems plaguing the data mining industry.244  Our every online activity
may be subject to public scrutiny—even such neutral and “anonymous” activi-
ties as web searches may be subject to outside inspection.245  Furthermore, the
government’s increasing role in the monitoring of Internet activity246 triggers
deep anxieties of history and literature.247
The law of information privacy in the United States, such as it is, is a
scattershot of individual regulations of different types of information—a mix of
federal laws, governing a few sensitive topics,248 and state laws, which vary
widely in their coverage.249  By contrast, the European Union provides more
general coverage through two affirmative Directives that construct legal norms
for both privacy and information protection.250
In light of the limited and meager legal backdrop surrounding privacy reg-
ulation in the United States, legal scholars have offered their own layer of study
on the issues involved in privacy in the information age.  Julie Cohen, for
example, has written about multiple topics in this area over many years, rang-
ing from an early article on anonymity over the Internet,251 to recent articles
about the conflicts and balances between privacy and Digital Rights Manage-
ment technologies.252  In addition, Marc Rotenberg and others from the Elec-
tronic Privacy Information Center have made careers out of policy papers and
speaking engagements dedicated to information related to privacy issues.253
One of the foremost academics in the area of privacy, Dan Solove, has written a
book on the subject matter suitable for a broad audience.254  These scholars and
others offer considerable guidance in understanding the law and policy of
privacy.
244 E.g., Tom Zeller, Jr., Breach Points Up Flaws in Privacy Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24,
2005, at C1.
245 This already happened in a well-known, recent leak of search records by America
Online.  Dawn Kawamoto & Elinor Mills, AOL Apologizes for Release of User Search Data,
CNET NEWS, Aug. 7, 2006, http://news.com.com/2100-1030_3-6102793.html.
246 See, e.g., Robert Pear, Panel Urges New Protection on Federal ‘Data Mining’, N.Y.
TIMES, May 17, 2004, at A12; EFF Sues AT&T to Stop Illegal Surveillance, EFF, Jan. 31,
2006, http://w2.eff.org/news/archives/2006_01.php#004369.
247 Consider, for example, J. Edgar Hoover’s illustrious history of spying on American citi-
zens in pursuit of President Roosevelt’s political agenda. See, e.g., DOUGLAS M. CHARLES,
J. EDGAR HOOVER AND THE ANTI-INTERVENTIONISTS:  FBI POLITICAL SURVEILLANCE AND
THE RISE OF THE DOMESTIC SECURITY STATE, 1939-1945 (2007).  Alternatively, consider
George Orwell’s dystopian future, in which Big Brother is always watching. GEORGE
ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949).
248 The most notable example is HIPAA’s “privacy rule.” See supra note 243.
249 A table summarizing the substantive coverage of state privacy laws is available through
the Electronic Privacy Information Center. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., Privacy Laws by State,
http://www.epic.org/privacy/consumer/states.html (last visited May 18, 2009).
250 Council Directive 2002/58, art. 251, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 (EC); Council Directive 95/
46, art. 189b, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).
251 See Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously:  A Closer Look at “Copyright Man-
agement” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996).
252 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575 (2003).
253 See the extensive list of presentations, testimony, and interviews in Marc Rotenberg’s
online biography, available at Marc Rotenberg, http://www.epic.org/epic/staff/rotenberg/
(last visited May 18, 2009).
254 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON:  TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMA-
TION AGE (2004).
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However, as with piracy, judges will not, and for that matter, should not,
follow the recommendations provided by academic discussion on information
and privacy issues.  The frame, for judges as well as for the lay reader, is cen-
tered on the norms established by topic-specific laws, and (possibly, in part) by
the range of major media articles.  The frame conceptualizes privacy as a
choice between business practices and some ephemeral value of individual pri-
vacy.  Many businesses have improved customer experiences and generated a
substantial amount of wealth through data mining practices, such as Ama-
zon.com’s recommendations of “similar items” to those in a user’s history.255
However, other practices, such as Facebook’s “Beacon” system, violate expec-
tations of privacy to a higher degree, and generate a great deal of social
unrest.256  Much of the media coverage of privacy issues is focused on “gray
areas” of social policy such as these, resulting in the construction of a nebulous
privacy frame characterized by only a moderate fear of serious repercussions
for violations of individual privacy.
The case I examine in the following section involved a much more impor-
tant privacy interest than in typical “gray area” circumstances, such as Ama-
zon.com’s recommendations.  The case involved deliberate and willful privacy
violations prohibited by general-purpose federal laws (e.g., the SCA, the Wire-
tap Act, and the CFAA).  In Theofel v. Farey-Jones257 and other cases center-
ing around such significant privacy interests, framing arguments have
considerable persuasive power, and the full weight of the privacy frame, such
as it is, can be brought to bear in support of a legal argument.
2. Theofel v. Farey-Jones
a. Background
In Theofel v. Farey-Jones, defendant Farey-Jones, while engaged in a sep-
arate legal dispute with plaintiff employees of Integrated Capital Associates,
Inc. (“ICA”), issued a subpoena to ICA’s Internet Service Provider, NetGate,
which requested the disclosure of all of the plaintiffs’ email messages.258  In
response, NetGate provided the defendant with many of the plaintiffs’ sent and
received email messages (still stored on its servers), most of which were unre-
lated to the legal dispute.259  The plaintiffs brought a civil suit against the
defendants for claims under the SCA (which prohibits unauthorized access to a
communications facility that disrupts an electronic communication in electronic
storage), the Wiretap Act (which authorizes an injured party to seek redress
against someone who intentionally intercepts, for example, electronic commu-
nication), and the CFAA (which prohibits unauthorized access to a computer
through conduct that involves interstate communication).260  The Wiretap Act
claim was dismissed quickly by both the district and appellate courts.261  The
255 See generally Amazon.com, http://www.amazon.com/ (last visited May 18, 2009).
256 See, e.g., Caroline McCarthy, Rough Seas Nearly Sink Facebook’s Beacon, CNET
NEWS, Nov. 30, 2007, http://www.news.com/8301-13577_3-9826664-36.html.
257 Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 341 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
258 Id. at 981.
259 Id.
260 Id. at 982, 986.
261 Id. at 986.
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district court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ SCA claim because NetGate author-
ized the defendant’s access,262 and dismissed the plaintiffs’ CFAA claim on the
grounds that the federal statute did not apply to third-party computer storage.263
b. Appellants’ Brief
In their brief before the Ninth Circuit, the appellants argued NetGate’s
implicit authorization and enablement of access did not satisfy the SCA’s statu-
tory bar for authorization of the defendants’ access to the emails, either in
itself, or because the authorization was obtained illegally.264  Appellants also
contended that application of the CFAA to information stored on third-party
computers was a question of first impression that the court should have consid-
ered and resolved, based, in part, on a reading that the legislative history and
social policy supported a finding that the CFAA covered third-party storage.265
I will focus my analysis on the SCA claim because appellants offered far
more on this claim in their brief, and because it is more appropriate to analyze
for the purposes of this Article.266  To achieve success on the SCA claim, the
appellants needed to resolve several ambiguities in the statute’s concept of
“authorization”—in particular, who could provide sufficient authorization,
what indicated the authorization had been provided in a valid manner, and what
scope of authorization was required.  In order to resolve these ambiguities, the
appellants needed to implicitly define the sort of information being accessed,
the parties who had rights in and control over the information, and the institu-
tions and devices storing the information.
The amount of framing in appellants’ brief is not overwhelming.  The
framing centered on the descriptions of the defendants’ activities and the nature
of the information acquired through defendants’ initial subpoena.  In the district
court’s opinion, and in the appellees’ brief, common labels for the defendant’s
activities included “unauthorized access”267 and access to “electronic docu-
ments.”268  By contrast, the appellants’ brief emphasized, and frequently
repeated, that the case involved access to “private e-mail communications” and
“confidential emails,”269 emphasizing both communication (the target of the
262 Id. at 982.
263 Id. at 986.
264 Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Opening Brief at 13-19, Theofel, 341 F.3d 978 (No. 02-15742),
2002 WL 32163299 [hereinafter Brief of Theofel Plaintiffs-Appellants].
265 Id. at 34-36.
266 The SCA claim was more focused on traditional statutory interpretation, and was riper
for cognitive framing effects. See infra Section III (explaining that cognitive framing works
in large part because judges are able to import equitable judgments into their choices among
multiple valid textualist interpretations of statutes).
267 Responding Brief of Defendant/Appellee Alwyn V.H. Farey-Jones at 9, Theofel, 341
F.3d 978 (No. 02-15742), 2002 WL 32163300 [hereinafter Brief of Theofel Defendant/
Appellee] (“The District Court concluded that these facts demonstrate that Farey-Jones’
access was authorized by NetGate and that Plaintiffs, therefore, failed to state a claim based
on unauthorized access.”).
268 Id. at 4 (“Within a few days of receiving the subpoena, NetGate produced a ‘sampling’
of some electronic documents . . . .”).
269 Brief of Theofel Plaintiffs-Appellant, supra note 264, at 1 (“This case presents the cut-
ting edge and important issue of whether federal statutory law prohibits an individual from
accessing and disclosing third party private email communications stored on remote serv-
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-3\NVJ301.txt unknown Seq: 39 14-SEP-09 12:34
Spring 2009] THE RITE OF RHETORIC 533
SCA) and privacy, the most powerful frame at work in this case.  In so doing,
the appellants’ brief connected the emails and the information contained in the
emails as closely as possible to ICA, and removed the emails as much as possi-
ble from NetGate, despite its physical control over the server storing the infor-
mation.270  A property metaphor and frame lurked beneath these attempts,
evoking trespass and supporting the claim raised by privacy framing that the
harm is like breaking into a home and rummaging around through the inside.271
As discussed below, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion incorporated this metaphor
directly.
Effective privacy framing occurs at a more abstract level than the specific
legal questions of statutory interpretation of the SCA.  It affects a judge’s inter-
pretation of the context, and attempts to convince a judge that the access
intruded into a personal and sensitive area, and that any legal question related
to it ought to have provided great protection to that area.  Arguing that one
party was overreacting cannot effectively counter a privacy claim.  Thus,
although the framing in the brief was not overwhelming or tightly coupled to
the specific interpretations offered by the plaintiffs, it nevertheless may have
had a powerful influence on the eventual decision of the Ninth Circuit.
c. Appellees’ Brief
At an abstract level, the appellees’ brief contended the SCA did not give
rise to a legal claim against Farey-Jones.  To escape liability, the appellees
offered a shotgun of legal theories to challenge the statute’s applicability.  The
first and foremost legal challenge involved NetGate’s authorization of the
access by Farey-Jones (and NetGate’s ability to offer valid legal authorization
to access the information).272  Next, appellees’ brief contended the statute did
not prohibit the use or disclosure of the information at issue, merely access to
the information.273  Later, the appellees argued the SCA did not protect plain-
tiffs’ personal computers,274 and the statute’s definition of “electronic storage”
did not encompass NetGate’s activity to make the information available to
Farey-Jones.275  The appellees further argued the meanings of several technical
ers.”); id. at 10 (“This action was brought because of the invasion of rights, including the
privacy rights of 13 individuals . . . who have had their personal and confidential emails
accessed by the defendants . . . .”); id. at 16 (“Thus, although defendants arguably may have
received authorization to access NetGate’s server, they exceeded that authorization by acces-
sing plaintiffs’ private e-mail communications.”).
270 See, e.g., id. at 16 (“There is simply no authority for the district court’s leap that Net-
Gate’s authorization for access to its server insulates defendants from liability for intention-
ally accessing the contents of private, third party e-mails that do not belong to NetGate.”).
271 The relationship between personal papers and constitutional privacy dates back to 19th
century scholarship, but is still very much alive in the 21st century information age. See,
e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Andrew J. DeFilippis, Note, Securing
Informationships:  Recognizing a Right to Privity in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 115
YALE L.J. 1086 (2006) (arguing increased sharing of personal information engendered by the
information age does not weaken the Fourth Amendment’s right to privity). See generally
68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 5 (2000).
272 Brief of Theofel Defendant/Appellee, supra note 267, at 9-10.
273 Id. at 11-13.
274 Id. at 15-20.
275 Id. at 21-24.
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and statutory terms to establish their points, including the concept of the stor-
age for the information (implying who controlled it, who had access to it, and
how it could be used)276 and the meaning of authorization in both a technical
and legal sense.277  Appellees’ arguments were credible, and the appellees only
needed to succeed on one theory to escape liability.  To appellees’ benefit,
when in doubt as to the proper interpretation of a statute, the rule of lenity
ought to play a role in favor of the appellees.278  Farey-Jones, in theory, had a
moderately strong case.
Similar to the appellants’ brief, the appellees’ brief was not heavy on
framing language.  The best label for their attempts at framing is “anti-pri-
vacy”—similar to the attempts at “anti-piracy” in previously discussed cases.
The appellees’ brief deliberately avoided use of the words “privacy” and “pri-
vate” in its statement of facts, and instead, referred to the emails as “electronic
documents.”279  This term fits better with the original process through which
Farey-Jones sought to request the information—a subpoena.  Many of appel-
lee’s attempts at anti-privacy framing tried to defeat the protection and the sen-
sitivity of the information by implying it was merely information under the
control and ownership of NetGate, rather than the plaintiffs.280  Another angle
of anti-privacy framing countered the appellants’ analogies of private spaces,
such as a personal home, offering instead, a model of a gateway or a door over
which passage was protected.281  The statute, in this model, protected only pas-
sage through the gateway (which was performed by NetGate, not Farey-Jones),
and not any use of the information.282  These analogies did not contain any
strong positive framing, but merely attempted to defuse appellants’ privacy
framing.
Without any significant framing beyond its attempts to weaken the con-
nection to privacy, appellees’ brief could not add a great deal of argumentative
weight through framing.  Introduction of the privacy frame generates concern
for the sensitivity of the information involved.  The appellees did nothing to
diffuse this concern, for example, by framing the ISP/client relationship as a
consumer-producer one in which the email was under the complete control of
the ISP, or by attempting to separate “access” from “use,” or by any of their
other analogies.  In effect, the framing in appellees’ brief was largely
ineffective.
276 Id. at 25-26.
277 Id. at 33-36.
278 See, e.g., Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) (“[A]mbiguity concerning
the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity . . . .”) (citing Bell v.
United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955)).
279 Brief of Theofel Defendant/Appellee, supra note 267, at 5 (“Plaintiffs’ present suit alleg-
ing unlawful access and dissemination of these electronic documents . . . . ”).
280 See id. at 8-9 (emphasizing NetGate’s relationship to the documents, implying owner-
ship and control).
281 Id. at 11-12 (going to lengths to distinguish “access” from “use,” saying “access” is
prohibited but “use,” once inside the system legitimately, is not restricted in any way by the
statute).
282 Id.
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d. The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion
Citing to the law of trespass, the Ninth Circuit interpreted “authorized” in
the SCA to exclude any authorization gained through fundamental decep-
tion.283  The court applied this standard to the facts at hand and found there was
a mistake (in the overbroad subpoena) sufficient to constitute deception, and
the “[d]efendants had at least constructive knowledge” it was improper.284  On
the issue of the nature of the storage of the emails, the court acknowledged
there might have been some contention over the first portion of the statute’s
definition of “electronic storage,” but stated the emails were certainly contained
within the statute’s second definition.285
At the outset, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion took a middle ground between
the briefs’ competing terms of “private email communications” and “electronic
documents,” referring simply to “email[s].”286  However, the opinion went on
to demonstrate strongly that the court was receptive to the appellants’ framing.
The court’s analysis quickly incorporated the concept of “trespass,” receptive
toward the metaphor that the emails represented a private space of the plaintiffs
rather than an open space where merely the gateway was protected.287  The
court also incorporated some indicative language in the opinion as well, includ-
ing the phrases “confidentiality of communications in electronic storage”288
and “private snooping.”289
In this case, compared to the piracy cases previously discussed, the briefs
offered perhaps the least amount of information to extract clear framing argu-
ments, yet the court’s opinion offered the clearest indication the framing was
central to its decision.  Perhaps privacy is simply a different sort of frame than
piracy, lending itself more toward subtle introduction, though explicit recogni-
tion.  Perhaps this is just the way the frame was used in the parties’ briefs in
this case.  Regardless of speculation, however, the appellants used demonstra-
bly more (and convincingly more effective) framing than the appellees, and
won both the legal and rhetorical battles.
D. Observations
In all of the cases discussed in my sample set, the party who drafted the
brief with the stronger framing won.  In Davidson, Blizzard’s brief centered on
the concept of piracy, an inherently strong frame.  It made strong arguments as
to why the defendants were guilty of piracy, and it made clear that interpreting
the law in plaintiffs’ favor would reduce the ills of the frame.  The brief for the
BnetD developers, on the other hand, began with a complex legal argument
283 Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 341 F.3d 978, 982-83 (9th Cir. 2003).
284 Id. at 983-84.
285 Id. at 985.
286 Id. at 981 (“We consider whether defendants violated federal electronic privacy and
computer fraud statutes when they used a ‘patently unlawful’ subpoena to gain access to e-
mail stored by plaintiffs’ Internet service provider.”).
287 Id. at 982-83.
288 Id. at 982 (“The Act reflects Congress’s judgment that users have a legitimate interest in
the confidentiality of communications in electronic storage at a communications facility.”).
289 Id. at 983 (“The subpoena’s falsity transformed the access from a bona fide state-sanc-
tioned inspection into private snooping.”).
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over preemption (introducing framing much later and sporadically), empha-
sized the weaker, and more abstract, frames of balance and competition, and
failed to establish clearly that siding with the developers would have had a
major benefit for balance and competition going forward.  In Theofel, the brief
submitted by the employees did not contain a large amount of framing, but it
effectively weaved terms such as “confidential” and “email communications”
into the debate, introducing and supporting a privacy frame, giving rise to a
property/trespass metaphor later adopted by the Ninth Circuit in its decision.
Farey-Jones’s brief did not include any more framing, and its attempts merely
weakened the connection between the privacy frame and the facts of the case at
hand.  Farey-Jones’s brief also failed to offer any counter frame, or any affirm-
ative equitable reason as to why it deserved to win, as it failed effectively to
contend that privacy was not a big deal; it simply argued the case was not about
privacy, an ultimately weak framing argument.
The contrast in Grokster is also enlightening.  Before the Ninth Circuit,
the industry’s brief emphasized technical discussion of both exact legal tests
and technology at the expense of framing, failing to include such direct keys as
“pirate” or “piracy” until late in the brief.  Grokster’s brief (before the Ninth
Circuit) implemented more framing, made it more central to the brief, mixed
balance, innovation, and anti-piracy framing, and was generally less technical
and more emotional.  The industry’s brief before the Supreme Court, on the
other hand, contained the most overpowering framing rhetoric of any of the
briefs discussed in this Article.  It not only deluged the reader with accusations
of piracy (leveled at the Grokster developers, not the users of the software,
whose piracy was not a serious issue), but it also twisted the balance and inno-
vation framing of Grokster’s earlier brief.  Grokster’s brief before the Supreme
Court included a moderate amount of framing (though far less than the indus-
try’s brief), but it could not closely connect the framing to its arguments, many
of which were procedural or jurisprudential (framing has no place in a discus-
sion of whether the courts or Congress is best equipped to resolve an issue).
Moreover, some of the framing in Grokster’s brief may have backfired, such as
the Joseph Schumpeter reference and its attempts to dilute Grokster’s personal
responsibility for the piracy crisis,290 which may have perversely served to
inflate piracy concerns, supporting the industry.
The judicial opinions in the cases I studied do not establish, with complete
certainty, that the parties’ framing was a major factor in the courts’ decisions.
However, this remaining uncertainty should not be surprising, nor should one
interpret it as an indication that framing arguments fall upon deaf ears.  The
ambiguities and uncertainties inherent in technology policy prevent judges
from making decisions of equity one way or the other with complete confi-
dence.  As a result, judges may imbue their opinions with the language of stat-
utes and precedents to lend credibility and viability to their judgments.  In
addition, the legal context of the cases discussed in this Article—the true ambi-
guities in the meanings of statutory and technical terms—created an easy win-
dow for a judge to state one definition of the statute, claim that it was a better
reading than others were, and apply it, without needing to offer any additional
290 See Brief for Grokster II Respondents, supra note 211, at 24-25.
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justification.291  The real decisional process behind the judges’ selection of one
definition over another hides beneath these layers of formality, as it seemed to
do, for example, in Davidson.
The cases also demonstrate what features of a framing argument cause it
to have the most impact, and what structures of framing arguments within par-
ties’ briefs cause them to be the most successful.  Specifically, an effective
framing argument chooses legal arguments to relate the frames to the argu-
ments; it chooses frames that are inherently strong, and that can be strongly
connected to the facts of the case; and it weaves the frames into the legal argu-
ments in such a manner that a decision in the arguer’s favor will reduce the
harm, or increase the benefit, inherent to the frame.  An effective brief, from a
framing perspective, begins with strong framing to orient the judge’s sense of
the case’s equities before the judge renders any real decision or interpretation
of the law.  An effective brief de-emphasizes detailed technical descriptions of
either the law or technology, and instead, emphasizes emotion and rhetoric.
Framing arguments play a major role in judges’ choices of proper interpre-
tation of statutes and of related technologies.  The case studies I offer in this
Article attempt to show that framing has an impact on the disposition of a case.
In the next section, I will provide a theory as to why this is so, and why it is
especially salient in the context of technology litigation.
III. WHY FRAMING WORKS (AT LEAST IN TECHNOLOGY LAW)
A. Davidson in More Detail
In this section, I look at one of the cases discussed above, Davidson v.
Universal Associates, in more detail.  I emphasize the ambiguities in the law
and the technology, consider the questions posed to the judge, and examine
how the winning brief addressed these issues through effective framing, how
the losing brief did not, and how the opinion failed to provide any adequate
rationalization for the decisions it made.  I then back down a little bit from the
full depths of this extreme legal realist position, and attempt to determine what
is evident, what is merely conjecture and speculation, and what should be taken
away from the case studies.  I will also discuss features to look for in future
cases to ascertain the significance of framing, and ways to determine whether
the truth matches the view of the skeptics or the cynics.
Ambiguities in terminology permeate technology law cases. Davidson
hinged on the interpretations of many different terms such as “interoperability”
and “effectiv[e] contro[l],” most of which had been recently introduced by prior
court cases or by statutes, and had not been frequently litigated.  These terms
ranged from the purely legal to the purely technical, and included many terms
that fell somewhere in between.  Consider the concept of an “extra element”
291 A major critique of textualism as a judicial philosophy is it simply cannot be complete
and leaves room for other factors in a court’s decision, especially at the margins.  In hard
cases, examining a statute’s “plain meaning” cannot be dispositive; judges cannot help but
refer, on some level, to pure reason, as well as other factors.  Daniel A. Farber, The Inevita-
bility of Practical Reason:  Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV.
533, 548-49 (1992).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-3\NVJ301.txt unknown Seq: 44 14-SEP-09 12:34
538 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:495
relied upon by the district court in Davidson.292 National Car Rental is a well
established and frequently cited 1993 case, but is not without ambiguity or
criticism.293  No less ambiguous is the technical term “Battle.net,” which was
alternately used to describe a mode of playing a game, a server to host online
game playing, and a service offered by Blizzard to its game players, sometimes
even in the same sentence.294  Adding to this complexity, of course, is that
copyright law protected “Battle.net” in different ways depending on which of
these incarnations was applicable.295  Even worse, many terms embedded in the
DMCA raise complex technical and legal questions of interpretation—consider
the terms “access,”296 “interoperability,”297 and “reverse engineering,”298 to
name three of the most important.  These ambiguous terms create a great deal
of flexibility for a court, particularly in the age of textualist-driven opinions
that base decisions on the “plain meaning” of the text of a statute, even when
that meaning is highly debatable.299
The legal and technological ambiguities are also reflected in the underly-
ing dynamism and uncertainty of the social policy context surrounding the
technology industry.  Scholars and the mass media constantly debate the true
292 Davidson & Assocs. v. Internet Gateway (Gateway), 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1175 (E.D.
Mo. 2004) (citing Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. 991 F.2d 426,
431 (8th Cir. 1993)).  One of the major legal issues addressed in the case was federal/state
preemption in the context of copyright law.  In National Car Rental, the Eighth Circuit
found that if a state law includes an “extra element” that goes beyond the federal copyright
provisions, then there is no preemption. Nat’l Car Rental, 991 F.2d at 431.
293 Appellants’ brief cited a recent Sixth Circuit case that called the extra element test “cir-
cular” and said cases citing it are “ad hoc, inconsistent, or wrong.”  Brief of Davidson
Defendants-Appellants, supra note 105, at 33 n.7 (citing Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283,
287 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005)).
294 See Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1169 (“To log on to the Battle.net service and access
Battle.net mode, the game initiates a[n] authentication sequence or ‘secret handshake’
between the game and Battle.net server.”).
295 Copyright law protects the source code used by the servers, but not the servers them-
selves.  Whether it protects the mode or service is a matter for debate, but the entanglement
of protected source code with both of these tends to incline courts toward protecting them.
296 The term “access” is found in § 1201(a)(1), and is also a key component of the Lexmark
Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 550 (6th Cir. 2004), opinion.
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2006); Brief of Davidson Defendants-Appellants, supra note 105,
at 58-59.
297 The term “interoperability” is part of the text of the § 1201(f) exception. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201(f) (2006).  Although its scope is unclear, appellants argued that the legislative history
behind this indicated that it intended to cover a broad swath of reverse engineering activity.
Brief of Davidson Defendants-Appellants, supra note 105, at 28.
298 Note, in particular, the Appellees’ brief’s (erroneous) addition of “reverse engineering”
to its first factor of the § 1201(f) exception. See Brief of Davidson Plaintiffs-Appellees,
supra note 108, at 30 (“The key requirements [for the § 1201(f) exception] are:  Appellants
must have lawfully obtained the right to use Blizzard’s program for reverse engineering; and
. . . .”) (emphasis added).
299 See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989) (upholding the
“plain meaning” rule).  In Ron Pair, the Supreme Court stated, “[t]he plain meaning of
legislation should be conclusive, except in the ‘rare cases [in which] the literal application of
a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.’” Id.
at 242 (citing Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).  The Court
applied this rule despite the fact that it was overturning the appellate court’s construction of
the statute.
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value and harm of technologies, such as peer-to-peer file sharing.300  No one
can confidently establish a balance of equities in a case like Davidson because
of the sheer number and significance of the unanswered questions.  How much
incentive to pirate does the existence of the BnetD server create?  How valua-
ble is the competition offered by the BnetD server?  Will the server’s existence
cause Blizzard to improve the official service?  These are unanswerable empiri-
cal and normative questions, and such questions arise in not only the Davidson
case, but all of technology law.
Together, the ambiguous terminology and uncertain social policy create,
in technology law, a flexibility for judges to import equitable judgments
(through selective interpretation of ambiguities) and a great deal of uncertainty
regarding the correct equitable judgment to import, especially if one’s consider-
ation is limited to the facts of the case at hand, as the judicial process often
prefers.  Therefore, successful arguments in technology law cases will be more
equity-driven than those of general law, to establish a rational and supportable
position on the shifting and uncertain territory of social policy in this field, and
to take advantage of the ambiguous legal context.  In addition, given the diffi-
culty of judges issuing social policy judgments based solely on the facts of the
case at hand, judges will be receptive to analogies to outside contexts (e.g., the
frames woven into the legal arguments), as judges can then rationalize their
decisions as not setting social policy, but merely following the social policy
already in place.
The appellees’ brief in Davidson fits this pattern.301  It emphasized piracy.
It did not draw a new understanding of social policy, but instead, endeavored to
show there were previous cases involving similar fact patterns, in which activi-
ties like those of the appellants were held to be illegal,302 and to show the brief
was just advocating the social policy balance previously established.  By con-
trast, the appellants’ brief in Davidson based many of its arguments on a direct
application of the statute’s text to the facts at hand.303  It put more effort into
describing the technology involved.304  In addition, appellants’ brief put more
effort into understanding the original purpose of the statute through references
to legislative history.305  Essentially, it asked the court to make its own social
policy judgment, one that went against many similar cases cited by the appel-
300 See, e.g., Michael Geist, Piercing the Peer-to-Peer Myths:  An Examination of the Cana-
dian Experience, FIRST MONDAY, Apr. 2005, http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/
index.php/fm/article/view/1217/1137.  Although the BnetD technology is not the same as
file sharing, it is a similar mixed-value technology that presents both harms (creating addi-
tional value for pirated video games and thus providing an incentive for piracy) and benefits
(creating competition in the market for Blizzard video game servers).
301 See supra Section II.B.2.c.
302 See Brief of Davidson Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 108, at 22 (“In the short history
of the DMCA, the Second Circuit and several district courts have held conduct similar to that
of Appellants violative of the DMCA.”).
303 Consider the extended gap, between line four on page forty-three of the Appellants’
brief, to footnote thirteen at the end of page forty-seven, which contains no citations outside
of the district court’s opinion and other case materials. See Brief of Davidson Defendants-
Appellants, supra note 105, at 43-47.
304 E.g., id. at 52-55 (arguing, for pages, that the detailed technical activities compromised
only “Battle.net mode” and not the copyrighted individual games).
305 Id. at 59-60.
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lees, based on the court’s independent evaluation of the technology and the
purposes behind the statute.  This was a lofty request by the appellants, one that
asked too much of a judge, given technology law’s inherent ambiguity and
dynamic social policy.
Judges will not obviously base their opinions on equitable judgments and
susceptibility to framing, even if these are the ultimate reasons behind their
decisions.  If a lower court judge rules openly based on equity, as demonstrated
by the connection between the facts at hand and an external frame, a judge
hearing the appeal will likely consider the equities and the relevance of the
frame ex ante and impose his or her own interpretations.  If a judge at the
district or appellate court level has any significant individual incentive, it is to
avoid higher courts overturning their decisions.  However, a judge can reduce
the risk of reversal by casting an equitable judgment as a textualist opinion.
This is an easy transformation in technology law, given the flexibility in termi-
nology.  As a legal matter, a court can simply define the meaning of a term in a
way that supports one side or the other, without providing any further explana-
tion, as the Davidson court did with its construction of the term “access.”306
By hiding equitable judgment under the cloak of statutory interpretation, a
judge retains credibility and is less likely to have his or her decision indepen-
dently reviewed on appeal.
The Eighth Circuit opinion resolved many difficult questions of law in
Davidson through simple textualist interpretations.  Consider the question of
the interpretation of the scope of the § 1201(f) exception.  After presenting the
text of the exception, the appellants’ brief supported its interpretation primarily
on the text of the statute, the facts of the case at hand, and criticisms of the
district court’s opinion.307  Contrast appellants’ position with the appellees’
brief, which began with the text of the exception and moved immediately to
citations from other cases.308  The Eighth Circuit sided with the appellees, but
did not mention any of the cited precedents, instead basing its opinion directly
on the text of the statute.309  Addressing the fourth factor of the § 1201(f) test,
which concerns whether circumvention constitutes infringement, the court sim-
ply said, “[a]ppellants’s circumvention in this case constitute[d] infringement”
because it enabled the online play of unauthorized copies of games.310  This
rationalization allowed the Eighth Circuit and other courts to maintain the
appearance of the usual legal order of cases—the predominant reliance on the
text of the law—while basing its decisions on less formal judgments based on
equities and precedents.
306 The court interpreted the highly ambiguous term “access” with sufficient confidence to
distinguish the Lexmark precedent. See Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 640-41
(8th Cir. 2005).
307 Brief of Davidson Defendants-Appellants, supra note 105, at 43-48.  Finally, after pages
of statutory text-based analysis, the argument cited to precedent, but for a minor point and in
a footnote. See id. at 47 n.13.
308 See, e.g., Brief of Davidson Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 108, at 31 (citing 321 Stu-
dios v. MGM Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1096 (N.D. Cal. 2004), and the district
court’s citation to Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 444 (2d Cir. 2001)).
309 See Davidson, 422 F.3d at 642.
310 Id.
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B. The Pattern of Framing Cases—What to Look For in Others
The cases I have examined follow a simple pattern.  The successful briefs
began with arguments and rhetoric tied to specific, media-friendly, “hot button”
issues.  They often contended the case at hand was exactly like a prior case that
also dealt with the hot button issue, and a decision in their favor would merely
extend the legal and social balance of that case to the instant one.  The legal
arguments for both sides centered on interpretations of ambiguous and vague
statutory and factual terms, and the interpretations offered by both sides repre-
sented colorable constructions of the relevant statute and the facts in light of
prior case precedent and other persuasive legal authorities.  Finally, the court’s
eventual opinion failed to address, or at least to refute fully, the legal merits of
the losing side, and instead, based its decision primarily on simple textual inter-
pretations.  If the court’s decision supported the side whose brief (and, presum-
ably, oral argument) constructed the most successful framing argument, there
was reason to suspect the framing argument was dispositive in the court’s
decision.
Note that no parts of this abstract pattern are confined to the context of
technology law.  This pattern may be just as prevalent in constitutional law
cases touching on abortion, gay marriage, torture, free speech, or other social
issues.  Application of this pattern to other areas of the law will render inappli-
cable some of the arguments I have offered to explain why framing is signifi-
cant and why it cannot simply be ignored or set aside in the context of
technology law.  However, perhaps others can offer alternative justifications in
these areas of the law, or perhaps, even if its effects are attenuated, lawyers and
scholars ought to identify and understand framing arguments in all contexts to
acquire and provide the court with a full picture of the issues.
C. Stepping Back
The above story seems plausible, but not convincing.  How certain is it
that framing is having a significant effect?  Given that judges cannot (or at least
are not likely to) directly acknowledge the framing in the text of the opinions,
the best evidence I have offered is a small sample size, an empirically meaning-
less correlation between strong framing and success (where “strong framing” is
subject to debate), and a theory of why framing ought to have a significant
effect.  Better support may come from asking the judges themselves, while they
are writing their opinions, assuming they are being completely honest and they
know their own minds (and are not just reiterating their own after-the-fact ratio-
nalizations).311  Even without this mind reading, two notable scholars, Anthony
Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner, argue cognitive techniques have an impact on
the legal process.312  Their objective is not to show that external framing by the
parties influenced a judicial decision, but rather that judges use rhetoric to gloss
311 Recently, Guthrie and his associates administered a Cognitive Reflection Test to 252
Florida trial judges, and determined through the results of the testing that judges often make
decisions intuitively, rather than deliberately.  Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench:
How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 27-29 (2007).  Of course, intuitive deci-
sions are far more susceptible to influence from framing than deliberative decisions.
312 See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 25, at 7.
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over opinions they have decided on some non-legal rationale.313  Amsterdam
and Bruner demonstrate the effects of rhetoric by case study, criticizing legal
rationales and describing how rhetoric itself covers omissions and weak
assumptions behind them.314  They examine internal conflicts in opinions, such
as the contrast between Justice Lewis Powell’s use of abstract and general lan-
guage in McCleskey v. Kemp315 and his supposedly common-sense ratio-
nale.316  Moreover, Amsterdam and Bruner demonstrate that Justice Powell’s
ostensible rationale is not always convincing, and that the McCleskey opinion
may be an after-the-fact rationalization of a pre-determined political decision.
In a book review published in The New Republic, Judge Richard Posner
criticizes Amsterdam and Bruner’s methodology, their support, and their con-
clusion.317  Judge Posner says they could have subjected Brown v. Board of
Education318 to a similar level of deconstruction and found its legal rationale
was weak, and that the Justices derived their opinion from cognitive trickery,
but they chose not to do so because they agreed with its holding.319  Judge
Posner notes the subtle hypocrisy and contradiction in Amsterdam and Bruner’s
work, such as their use of poorly chosen statistics right on the heels of their
derision for the validity of statistics, and their relentless bias and use of rhetoric
to make their arguments.320  Judge Posner also criticizes Amsterdam and
Bruner’s claim of causation, even granting correlation, claiming it is just as
easy to believe the Justices in McCleskey reached their decisions through rea-
son and then wrote their opinions using cognitive techniques, either uncon-
sciously or consciously, to increase their persuasive power as prose.321
Several features of framing’s influence, as I use the term, allow my argu-
ments to escape Judge Posner’s criticisms.  First, I am not criticizing the judges
for using framing to support an unsupportable legal decision; rather, in technol-
ogy law, many opposing briefs are almost equally supportable, and a com-
pletely implausible argument is hard to construct because the law and
technology contain so much ambiguity.  Framing influences judges at a more
subtle level, by changing their interpretations of ambiguous terms and by
adjusting their perceptions of the significance and relevance of precedents—
much more cognitive effects with equally potent legal ramifications.  These
shifts in the minds of the judges convert a situation with two almost perfectly
balanced legal constructions into a situation where one side’s arguments seem
far more legally valid than the other’s arguments.  In addition, the nature of the
judges’ decisions and opinions, based on the interpretation of ambiguous terms
and precedents, permits them to be influenced by framing, and yet to disclaim
completely (or even fail to recognize) that influence.
313 Id.
314 Id. at 208-10 (analyzing the Baldus study in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)).
315 McCleskey, 481 U.S. 279.
316 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 25, at 215-16.
317 Posner, supra note 32.
318 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
319 Posner, supra note 32, at 49-50.
320 Id. at 52.
321 Id. at 55.
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Let me offer one more reason to believe judicial decisions are being influ-
enced by framing.  In contrast to approaches such as that of Amsterdam and
Bruner, the frames I study are internal, not external.322  Frames, such as piracy,
are developed and applied entirely within the context of the technology indus-
try; though outside meanings of piracy may have deeper external connections,
such as the historical concept of “piracy” and its relation to theft and unjust
enrichment, I do not include these as significant components of the weight and
significance of the frame.  My frames are closely connected to the facts of the
case at hand, and are much harder to “escape” (akin to the fabrications of
Goffman)323 by reason and examination of legal doctrine, which itself rein-
forces the frames in many ways.  Lakoff’s frames, like Goffman’s and Amster-
dam and Bruner’s, are external, based on broad psychological contexts with
only weak associations to the context at hand.  Even if judges and other
rational, intelligent decision-makers can set aside psychological manipulation
in Lakoff’s context, judges may be nonetheless swayed in mine.
When deciding cases in technology law, judges swim adrift in a sea of
ambiguity; technology law does not pose major policy issues like constitutional
law decisions, where for decades parties have raised and debated the same
issues and fact patterns in courtrooms, houses of the legislatures, and law
reviews.  Judges will reach for the nearest life raft, find frames (closely linked
to the facts at hand both through the news media and through the persuasive
and frequent exhortations of the parties’ briefs), and discover they can make
everything clear and ordered in the world.
IV. CONCLUSION
Followers of the modern technology law movement cannot help but notice
the importance of the notion of “piracy” in winning the war, both in the media,
and in the courtroom.  A closer look at a few cases reinforces my observation,
not just for piracy, but also for other concepts, such as innovation and privacy.
A simple model of the process of adjudication in technology law provides sev-
eral reasons to suspect that rhetoric heavily influences the shaping of the law by
the courts.  The amount of influence is difficult to gauge, but the model and the
few cases presented in this Article should create some amount or degree of
suspicion.  There is no good reason to think framing improves the resulting
quality of legal decision-making.
What can we, the legal community, do about it?  We must be alert.  Judges
must be alert to reduce the influence of framing on their decisions, especially
when more objective equity balances can be determined.  Attorneys must be
alert so they can defuse the other side’s framing, and they must be competent to
maximize their own framing, reinforcing the traditional zealous advocacy
model of effective litigation.  Finally, the news media must be alert to the influ-
322 My internal/external distinction differs considerably from Orin Kerr’s.  Kerr’s internal
perspective views the law of the Internet through the construction of a “cyberspace,” which
is to be treated like a place, with real world laws applied analogously; his external perspec-
tive examines the Internet as a collection of physical wires. See Orin S. Kerr, The Problem
of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357 (2003).
323 See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
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ence they have on the judicial process, and must be as honest and as balanced
as possible in their reporting, so the public’s perceptions of the social benefits
and costs of technology are as accurate as possible.
